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Abstract
The overarching goal of this thesis is to further our understanding about opinion evolution
in networked societies. Such insights can be used in a variety of elds such as economy,
marketing, transportation, egress, etc. Three main subjects build up this interdisciplinary
research: Sociology, Statistical Mechanics, and Network Sciences. In this thesis, for macro-
level (or society-level) analyses, techniques from statistical mechanics have been borrowed
to mathematically model the opinion dynamic on dierent network topologies based on
dierent interaction models. Also, for micro-level (individual-level) analyses, Individual
Decision Making Algorithms (IDMA) have been designed. To account for both macro-level
and micro-level dynamics, these two regimes are combined resulting in a more accurate model
for opinion propagation. Assessing the controllability of such dynamics through experiments
in presence of actual humans is the part of this thesis.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Humans have always interacted with each other, either in small social groups such as a
circle of close friends or larger social settings such as social media websites. Thus, they have
likely always been attuned to the preferences and positions of others. At the same time,
we have evolved sophisticated sensory systems and brains capable of reaching independent
conclusions about the world. Therefore, in our eorts to function eectively, we have likely
had to balance our own experiences, ideas, and beliefs with those of close and powerful others
with whom we interact.
Through interactions, a specic idea, an opinion or a thought can initiate, develop, and
in some cases, spread to the whole society. The study of such evolution trends traditionally
falls into the eld of social psychology, however, in recent years, borrowing techniques
from the realm of statistical physics [1], mathematical sociologists [2] started investigating
the emergence of consensus and divergence in networked nodes by constructing simplistic
interaction models [3, 4]; however, the assumption in these simplistic interaction models is
often, that every individual reacts the same way in response to dierent situations. These
statistical methods are in the form of Dierential Equations representing the time evolution



















• Frequency of messages
Communication
• Network Topology
• Types of communication
Prominent actors-j
• 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩𝑖 ∩ Comp. I
























































Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of people's social interactions, information resources,
and decision making processes
1.1.1 Dierential Equation Models (DE-Models)
Such dierential equations are derived by using aggregate parameters of the society (e.g.
the total number of people supporting a specic ideology in the society). As a result, the
solutions of these dierential equations explain the aggregate behavior of the society. But,
they fail to include and explain individual level parameters and behaviors in the dynamics
of opinion evolution. DE-Models have roots in the statistical analyses of order-disorder
transitions in the paradigm of the Ising model.
Ising model is a mathematical model in statistical mechanics which studies ferromag-
netism in alloys [5]. This model has discrete variables that represent magnetic spins. The
spins can be in one of the two states (+1 or −1). Each spin can also get aligned with the
neighboring spins. Ising model studies the transition from an initial disordered state (of
spins) to an ordered state (where the spins are aligned) as an outcome of the interactions
between spins. As a result of the available similarities between equations related to the
Ising model and those of social interactions, statistical physics tools have been often used
2
to study social interactions [6, 7]. A statistical physics approach investigates the ways local
interactions between agents can lead to order starting from a disordered initial condition [8,
9]. Direct outcomes of this approach are several elegant theories of emergent social behaviors,
such as evolution of opinions, consensus formation, properties of elections, and formation of
a common language.
The Ising model, based on a macroscopic approach, uses a master equation for global
variables to study the main characteristics of ordering processes in such complex networks.
The Master Equation is a set of rst-order dierential equations describing how the






T (m|m′)P (m′, t)−
∑
m6=m′
T (m′|m)P (m, t) (1.1)
where, the quantity T (m|m′) is the transition rate from state m′ to state m, and is only
dened for m 6= m′.
1.1.2 Agent Bast Models (AB-Models)
Although DE-Models are capable of predicting the opinion dynamic in the society, they ignore
individual level parameters. People aect each others' mental states through interactions,
but this does not mean every person changes opinions as a result of his/her interactions.
Individual's perceptions, past experiences, and background (cultural, political, religious,
etc.) are some of the important factors in this process. Individual decision making abilities
help the person to analyze all the information acquired (from conventional media, social
media, dierent events, etc.), and then conclude whether or not s/he should change her/his
opinion.
Decisions can be described in terms of three essential components: alternatives,
anticipated consequences, and uncertainty. Despite vast diversity in the eld of judgment
and decision-making, its boundaries and major theoretical concerns are mostly related to the
historically dominant expected utility family of theories made popular by Von Neumann &
Morgenstern [10] and Savage [11, 12]. The heart of the theory, sometimes called the rational
expectations principle or expectancy-value model [13], proposes that each alternative course
3
of action or choice option should be evaluated by weighting its global expected satisfaction-
dissatisfaction with the probabilities that the component consequences will occur and be
experienced. For example, in the Logit model, the relative frequency of usage of a strategy
is proportional to the number of times it was successful. In mathematical terms, this law
of relative eect [14] reads p(i) = N(i)/(Σi′N(i′)) = e
U(i)/T
Σi′e
U(i′)/T , where for any parameter
T (sometimes called the `social temperature'), U(i) = T lnN(i) is the utility function,
somewhat arbitrarily dening a preference scale.
However, although expectancy-value theory has been very successful in explaining central
concepts in uses and gratications research, other factors have been recognized that inuence
the process. For example the social and psychological origins of needs, which give rise to
motives for behavior, may be guided by beliefs, values, and social circumstances into seeking
various gratications through media consumption (Fig. 1.1) and other non-media behaviors.
In a network setting, such as Twitter, one's estimate of rewards are not absolute quantities,
but are inuenced by opinions of friends and neighbors. Social scientists, for many years
have developed theories of group position [15], social identity [16], and system justication
[17]. Now, such theories can be validated quantitatively by analyses of retweets, via, hat
tip and mention conventions which have been shown to be analogous to broadcasting one's
position, and helps explain how virality, meme propagation, and opinion formation occur on
social networks [18].
In reality, not everyone responds the same way in dierent situations. To demonstrate
this non-deterministic behavior, dierent models for individual decision making have been
proposed [19, 20, 21]. In dierent studies, Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) techniques are
used to simulate individual decision making. In ABM, the idea is to construct computational
entities (known as agents) with some properties. These agents function in parallel to simulate
real phenomena. Agent based modeling has been applied in various elds such as molecular
dynamics [22, 23], cellular automata [24], and population biology [25]. In social dynamics,
the goal is to address the problem of emergence from the lower levels of the social system to




Although interactions among society members might lead them to change their opinions,
there are individuals in the society who never change their ideas. However, they are able to
aect other people's perceptions through interactions. To explain such behavior, the concept
of non-conformity was introduced to the eld of opinion evolution; in essence, these agents
do not conform with the opinions of other agents. These non-conformists are also called
inuences or zealots in the literature. Presence of inuences has proven to be eective
in dramatically changing the dynamic of opinion evolution. In some studies, inuences are
used (as control inputs) to control the dynamic of opinion evolution [26, 8, 27].
With the rapid improvement in the accessibility of computing resources, social scientists
have been able to practice their models on larger scales to represent a more realistic behavior
of the entire society [22]. Such simulations can also be used as a means of assessing the
accuracy of assumptions and analytical analyses of quantitative sociology. In social dynamics,
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation techniques are used because of the random nature of social
interactions.
The main contributions of this thesis are:
1) Systematically studying the idea of exposing a society to inuences ( or inexible agents)
who never change opinions but do alter the dynamics of the system. The main research
hypothesis of this part is that group level diusion of opinions and ideology can be modeled
and analyzed using discrete choice models for individuals interacting via gossip, and this
opinion diusion process can be controlled or at least contained using strategically placed
inuences. It was shown that by using such moderating agents the system can be forced
to approach desired global behavior [8]. Nevertheless, so far, the placement of these control
inputs has been random. We believe that a more methodical approach is very much needed
to deal with this problem.
2) Addressing the gap between methods from quantitative sociology (DE-Models) and
methods related to individual decision making (AB-Models) to develop a platform which
is able to take advantage of both methods in predicting opinion evolution in a society.
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In the remainder of this chapter, rst, a brief literature review on dierent aspects of
social dynamics is provided. Then the observed scientic gaps in the preceding studies are
listed. At the end, the objectives of this thesis addressing the scientic gaps are described.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Interaction Models
In the study of large scale order as a result of local interactions, the Voter model [28, 29],
the Sznajd-Weron model [30, 31], and the Bounded Condence model [32, 33] have received
considerable attention. These interaction models, their similarities and dierences, and their
related literature are provided below.
The Voter Model
Denoting the opinion of a node by s, in the Voter dynamics, a node i and one of its neighbors
j are randomly selected, and si is set equal to sj (or, ↑⇓−→↑⇑). It has been proven that the
Voter model tends to increase the order of the system [34]. Slanina et.al. [27] show that on a
complete graph, the mathematical model has the form of a Fokker-Planck equation and can
be solved analytically. Watts and Strogatz [35] considered the Voter model on a small-world,
and they found out that the initial dynamic is similar to a one-dimensional lattice. Voter
dynamic includes only two agents and ignores the concept of social validation. Sznajd model,
addresses this shortcoming by including three or four agents.
The Sznajd Model
Although the Sznajd-Weron model is similar to the Ising or Voter models in spirit, it describes
a decision making mechanism in a closed community based on social validation. Sznajd
model suggests that at each time step, a pair of neighbors in the same state, convinces their
neighbor to join them (↑↑⇓−→↑↑⇑) [36]. In the Sznaid model, two types of steady states are
always reached, either complete consensus (ferromagnetic) or stalemate (anti-ferromagnetic).
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The Sznajd model has been studied on dierent networks. One such work by Elgazzar
[37] studies the Sznajd model on a small world network and observes that the stalemate
situation disappears by including short-cutting neighbors. This work also considers the
eects of including leaders (inuences) in the behavior of the society. Further research by
Schulze [38] investigates the eects of long-range interactions on opinion spread and phase
transition through the Sznajd model. Slanina et.al. have proposed the analytical results for
the Sznajd model [27] on a complete graph. They have witnessed sharp phase transitions in
their simulations.
It is important to note that Voter model and Sznajd model are dened over a discrete
opinion space; i.e. +1 vs −1 (or up spins vs down spins). These models fail to model opinions
in between the two extremes. This shortcoming in interaction models was addressed by
introducing a continuous opinion space. Bounded Condence interaction model is based on
a continuous opinion space.
The Bounded Condence Model
In bounded condence, connectivity is not the only condition for interaction. For two
connected agents with opinions x(t) and x′(t), the dierence between the opinions has to
be less than a specic threshold (|x(t) − x′(t)| < d) to interact. After the interaction is
complete, agents get closer to each other in the opinion space by a fraction, µ (convergence
parameter) [32]. Bounded condence can be best described by mathematical representation:
if |x(t)− x′(t)| < d, then:
x(t+ 1) = x+ µ.(x′(t)− x(t)) (1.2)
x′(t+ 1) = x′ + µ.(x(t)− x′(t)) (1.3)
Fortunato et al. have shown that on complete graph, regular lattices, and scale-free
networks for d > 1
2
complete consensus happens (all the agents have the same opinions)
[39]. Ben-Naim et al. have mathematically modelled and solved the bounded condence
on a complete graph [40]. Leguna et al. and Porri et al. have done extensive numerical
simulations on bounded condence and have proven that the number of clusters in the
society in the steady state depends on the threshold d. They also show that the time to
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reach stationary state (the convergence time) depends on the convergence parameter, µ [41,
42].
1.2.2 Individual Decision Making Algorithms
Individual Decision Making Algorithms (IDMAs) have been designed with dierent levels
of accuracy and complexity. It has been concluded that in order to investigate the global
behavior of a society, simpler IDMAs are more suitable and computationally cost-ecient
[43]. However, to study the behavior of an individual or a small group, higher levels of
complexity are needed to demonstrate and explain decision making patterns. According to
Gilbert [44], this complexity of agents might range from production system architectures
(i.e. agents that follow simple IF-THEN rules) to agents with sophisticated cognitive
architectures which take into account emotions and feelings of the agent too. In the previous
section, the theory of expected utility and related studies were explained.
1.2.3 Inuence
In the past few years, the eect of inuences, sharply opinionated agents, zealots or
committed agents has been the main subject of numerous studies in agent-based modeling
on almost all kinds of networks [45, 46]. The idea is exposing the society to the agents
whose ideas never change [47]. Galam [48] and Mobilia [49] studied the role of inuences
on the breaking of democratic opinion dynamics. Xie [50, 51] investigated the consensus
in the presence of competing committed groups. Also, Yildiz [52] explains binary opinion
dynamics with stubborn agents.
1.2.4 Networks
Among elements of social dynamics, topology (the structure determining which agents can
interact, with which frequency and intensity) carries a lot of importance [53, 54]. In a
network, agents are placed on nodes (vertices), and the links between nodes represent a




The Erd®s Rényi random graph G(N, p) is dened as N labeled nodes connected by n
edges which are chosen randomly from (N(N − 1))/2 possible edges [55]; i.e. every pair
of nodes is connected with probability p = n
[(N(N−1))/2] . Since there are C
n
[(N(N−1))/2] ways
to construct such a graph, a probability space is formed in which every realization of the
random graph owns an equal probability of happening. The probability of constructing a
specic realization of a random graph such as G0 with the specications mentioned above is
P (G0) = p
n(1− p)[N(N−1))/2]−n.
These graphs are static graphs; i.e. the number of vertices in the network is constant.
Isolation of vertices could happen, Fig. 1.2. Most importantly, dierent graphs with the
same set of nods (N) and edges (E) are possible to be formed. In the limit p −→ 1, ER
graph becomes the Complete Graph where all nodes are connected to each other.
Small World
Small World is a well-known network structure in which the average distance between two
agents is small [56]. Also, unlike the ER graph, many triangles are available, Fig. 1.3. In
[35], authors characterize a SW network by two parameters: the characteristic path length
L(p), dened as the number of edges in the shortest path between two vertices, averaged over
Figure 1.2: The Erd®s Rényi random graph
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all pairs of vertices, and the clustering coecient C(p), dened as follows. If a node i has
k connections, then at most k(k−1)
2
edges can exist between its neighbors (this occurs when
every neighbor of i is connected to every other neighbor. The clustering coecient C(p)
denotes the fraction of these allowable edges that actually exist, averaged over all nodes.
Small-world networks feature high values of C(p) and low values of L(p).
Figure 1.3: The Small World (SW) network topology
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Barabási-Albert
In reality, most networks are not static but evolving with new agents entering the network
and making connections with the already existing ones. The Barbasi-Albert (BA) model [57,
58] is one of the most famous models for growing networks, and it is constructed as follows:
starting from a small set of m fully interconnected nodes, new nodes are introduced one by
one. Each new node selects m older nodes according to the preferential attachment rule, i.e.,
with probability proportional to their degree, and creates links with them. The procedure
stops when the required network size N is reached, Fig. 1.4.
Figure 1.4: The Barabási-Albert network topology
1.3 Scientic Gaps and Objectives
1.3.1 Scientic Gaps
Gap 1. Some of the interaction models have not been mathematically modelled on all of
the available network topologies. In addition, in some of the already studied interaction
models, the eect of inuences has not been accounted for. Developing mathematical
models for opinion evolution based on dierent combinations of interaction models and
network topologies in presence of inuences can provide answers on progression of opinion,
convergence time, and nal distribution of opinions in the society. Also, these mathematical
models can be used in studying the controllability of such dynamics.
Gap 2. As mentioned in previous sections, quantitative sociology studies social dynamics
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only on societal levels without taking into account any individual decision making. On the
other hand, studies on decision making mostly consider the individual without taking into
account eects of the society. Augmenting these two techniques could provide information
on their mutual eects on each other. Such augmented systems can also predict the opinion
evolution more accurately. Again, manipulation of perception by incorporating inuences
can potentially lead to the control of opinion evolution.
Gap 3. Current state of the art involves control of opinion propagation by randomly
introducing inuences to a community. However, the authors believe the placement of
these inuences in the network, their strength, their density, and their activation time
are important factors in maximizing their inuence. Understanding the role each of these
parameters play in the dynamics of opinion evolution could potentially lead to an optimal,
cost-eective, and time-eective control strategy.
1.3.2 Research Objectives
The following objectives attempt to address the scientic gaps mentioned above:
Objective 1 (addressing Gap 1 ). Mathematical modeling of opinion evolution (DE-
Models). In this section of the thesis, mathematical modeling of various combinations of
interaction models and network topologies will be performed in the framework of the Master
Equation (ME). ME is a stochastic dierential equation describing how the population is
distributed over the opinion space and how such distribution changes with time. All the
analyses will be performed accounting for the presence of inuences (control inputs) in the
society. Analytical solutions are expected to cast light on dierent aspects of the system
such as convergence time, equilibrium state opinion distribution, progression of the opinion
dynamics, controllability of the system, etc.
Objective 2 (addressing Gap 1 ). Numerical simulations of the systems from
Objective 1. This part will be devoted to extensive Monte Carlo simulations of the systems
indicated in Objective 1. These simulations will be used to validate the precision of modeling
procedures and accuracy of analytical solutions. Also, these simulations will serve as a guide
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towards appropriate time scaling procedures of the systems. Eects of control inputs on the
nal state of the society can be investigated with such simulations.
Objective 3 (addressing Gap 2 ). Decision making (AB-Models). So far, only the
objectives related to the study of the aggregate behavior (macro-level parameters) of the
society have been mentioned. This section of the thesis will concentrate on the decision
making processes of individuals (designed in the framework of a Probabilistic Finite State
Automata (PFSA)). The decision making algorithm will be able to model the behavior of
agents when they are exposed to external events, and also when they interact with other
people. This part of the study combines micro-level and macro-level parameters of opinion
evolution. Such combination can be instrumental in understanding the mutual eects that
the society and the individual have on each other; or, how inuences can alter an individual's
decisions and cognitive states.
Objective 4 (addressing Gap 3 ). Assessing controllability of collective human
behaviors in presence of actual humans. This part of the thesis will be devoted to
studying the controllability of collective behavior of people in an experimental setup in
presence of actual humans. Dierent inuence scenarios will be developed with the purpose
of maximizing the inuence of control inputs.
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Chapter 2
Modeling and Numerical Simulations of
the Inuenced Sznajd Model
2.1 Objective
Various studies in the eld of opinion evolution consider mathematical modeling of
interaction models on dierent network topologies; [59] is one of the studies in which the
Voter interaction model is mathematically modelled on a complete graph to investigate the
eect of biased nodes on the conrollability of the dynamic. Fig. 2.1 shows the composition
of the society including the inuence groups.
At rst, [59] derives the Master equation on a complete graph which can be characterized
by dening the magnetization parameter m = N+−N−
N
, where at a certain instant, there are
N+ nodes in state +1, N− nodes in state −1. N = N+ +N− nodes make up the vertices of
the graph. At each time step, a node i and one of its neighbors j is randomly selected, and
si is set equal to sj. In addition to the N sites, there are I = I+ + I− external agents with
respective pre-conceived allegiance to states +1 and −1.
Dening the control variable u = I+−I−
I
, the master equation is composed as [59]:


















Figure 2.1: Population composition and external inuence groups [59]
where,
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In the limit N →∞, assuming that I  N , I−Pm+2/N + I+Pm−2/N ≈ IPm, with proper
scaling of time as τ = t/N2 and noting that N+I−−N−I+ = NI2 (m− u), the master equation
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A(m) = I (u−m) (2.6)
Then, the authors continue to solve the derived dierential equation, and assess the
controllability of the dynamics. [59] is a thorough example of using the master equation to
model opinion evolution on a network (DE-Models).
The Voter model is considered one of the simplest interaction mechanisms, and since only
two agents are present in the interaction mechanism, the social validation concept is ignored
in the Voter model. Sznajd model is an interaction mechanism which brings in the social
validation concept. Sznajd model in presence of inuences is the focus of the this chapter.
First, a review of the most recent studies on the Sznajd model is provided. In section 2.3,
the Sznajd model is mathematically modelled on a complete graph in presence of inuences.
In section 2.4, the modelled system is analyzed and interesting behaviors of the system are
presented and discussed. In section 2.5, a summary of all the ndings of this chapter is
presented and the chapter is concluded.
2.2 Recent Studies on the Sznajd Model
In recent years, nonconformity has been a focal point for a large number of studies on the
Sznajd model. In these studies, two types of nonconformity are usually considered: anti-
conformity and independence. In a study by Nyczka et al., the authors investigate the eect
of two types of social responses: conformity and anti-conformity in the dynamics of the
Sznajd model on a complete graph [60]. In this dynamic, conformists choose the opinion of
the group with probability p1 (i.e. ↑↑⇓−→↑↑⇑ with probability p1, no change with probability
1 − p1), and anticonformists choose the opposite opinion of the group with probability p2
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(i.e. ↑↑⇑−→↑↑⇓ with probability p2, no change with probability 1 − p2). In another study
by the same group, authors expand this idea to investigate the qualitative and quantitative
dierences of the two types of nonconformity under the framework of the q-voter model [61]
on a complete graph. In this dynamic, anticonformists choose the opposite opinion of the
group, and the independent agents do not follow the group; they act independently and
choose the opposite opinion of the group with probability 1
2
.
J¦drzejewski [62], expanded these studies with the Pair Approximation methodology to
study the behavior of a q-voter model with stochastic noise characterized as Independence
on several complex networks. In this model, with probability p, a chosen agent acts
independently and adopts the opposite opinion or preserves the old one with equal chances.
Otherwise, with probability 1− p, the agent will be a conformist.
A special class of independent agents are zealots (sometimes called inexibles or
inuences). These are agents who do not change their state throughout the progression
of the dynamics. Mobilia uses Mean-Field approximation method to analytically model the
nonlinear q-voter model in presence of zealots [63]. In this work, for simplicity, repetition
in choosing agents is allowed. The derived transition probabilities are used for bifurcation
analysis and nding critical zealotry density. Analyses presented in this work relate to special
cases of symmetric and parameterized asymmetric zealotry distributions.
In this chapter, we model and investigate the eects of inuences and initial conditions on
the dynamics of the Sznajd model. The problem setup is closely linked to [63], but in contrast
to Mobilia's work, it does not allow repetitive agent choices. Disallowing repetitive agent
choices is not only more realistic, but surprisingly, leads to a new master equation which
can be solved under specic conditions. Also, we do not observe rapid phase transitions
in this dynamic. Here, inuences are nonconformists of the Independent type, who never
change their opinions (as opposed to [62]) but aect other agents' decisions. It is worth
mentioning that inuences of this study are dierent from what have been used in [60, 61].
In [60, 61], the nonconformists are Anticonformists, however in our study, we have chosen
Independents as nonconformists.
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2.3 Inuenced Sznajd Model
In this study, a complete graph is considered. A complete graph can be characterized by
a magnetization parameter dened as m = N+−N−
N
, where, N+ represents the number of
agents in state +1, and N− represents the number of agents in state −1 at any instant.
N = N+ + N− nodes make up the vertices of the graph [64]. The system also includes
I = I+ + I− inuences, in which I+ represents the number of inuences in state +1, and I−
represents the number of inuences in state −1.
In the original Sznajd Model [65], the idea of social validation is used to introduce a spin
dynamic with ±1 alignments:
 In each time step a pair of spins Si and Si+1 is chosen to change spins of their nearest
neighbors, namely Si−1 and Si+2.
 If Si = Si+1 then Si−1 = Si and Si+2 = Si (social validation).
 If Si = −Si+1 then Si−1 = Si+1 and Si+2 = Si.
In this chapter, a simplied Sznajd model dynamics, modied for a complete graph,
rather than a one-dimensional lattice, introduced in [27], is used which inherits the social
validation concept, but has slightly dierent update rules:
 In each time step a pair of nodes (i and j), respectively in states Si and Sj are chosen
at random and attempt to change the state Sk of a randomly chosen common nearest
neighbor, k ∈ Ni ∩Nj, where Ni is the set of neighbor nodes of node i.
 If Si = Sj then Sk = Si (social validation).
 If Si = −Sj then nothing happens.
Due to the stochastic process of spin ips, Master Equation (ME) is used to formulate
this model. ME represents the time evolution of the probability of a system having any
conguration of ±1 spins dened by m. Eqn. 2.7 represents the general form of the ME
which includes in/out-ow rates calculated as probabilities [64].
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where, in/out-ow rates are derived based on the Sznajd model as:
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By substituting Eqn. 2.8 in Eqn. 2.7, after some manipulations, and by dening the
control variable as u = I+−I−
I
, for large but nite population sizes N , the master equation
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Assuming that a steady state density function exists, limt→∞ dPmdt = 0 [66], the steady
state density Pss(m) has to satisfy:
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which is a homogeneous second order linear dierential equation. The terms can be

















Integrating the same equation and using the identity
∫ 1
−1 Pss(m)dm = 1, the general form




+ A(m)Pss(m) = 4N (2.12)
The coecients of this equation are presented in Table 2.1.
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where v(m) = e
∫ A(m)
B(m)
dm. Pss(m) after normalization, provides the steady state distribution
of the population starting from an initial distribution m0. In the simplied setting of I = 0
and N → ∞, the population almost surely converges to either all +1 or all −1 states, the
two attractors for that dynamics, i.e. Pss(m) = δ(m±1) where δ is the Dirac delta function.
Which direction the population converges to depends on the initial starting condition, i.e.
whether m0 is greater or less than 0. However, for all these cases, it is observed that
Pss(m = 0) = 0, i.e. at steady state the probability of the population being equally divided
between +1 and −1 states is almost surely 0, which stems from m = 0 being an unstable
equilibrium and the stochastic nature of the process.
Keeping these in mind, the ODE is solved separately over two ranges, Pssl solved over
−1 ≤ m ≤ 0 and Pssh solved over 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 with Pss(m = 0) = 0, as the boundary
condition for both. It will be shown later that the entire span [−1, 1] of possible starting
values for m0 can be divided into two distinct regions,
 a convergence zone (ZC), starting from which the population consistently converges
toward a particular attractive state - consequently, the steady state PDF matches either
Pssl or Pssh, and
 an indeterminate zone (ZI), starting from which the population can, by chance converge
toward any of the two attracting states, thus Pss(m) has a bimodal distribution which
is a combination of Pssl and Pssh.




Using a variable-step Runge-Kutta method, Eqn. 2.12 is numerically solved and plotted
for dierent population sizes. Then, results from the Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are
overlayed on it.
Figure 2.2 includes numerical solution of Eqn. 2.12 (solid lines) as well as data points
from MC simulations for dierent population sizes (N). Larger populations are characterized
by higher peak values and lower variances. Additionally, the assumption of large but nite
N lower bounds the population size. This can be seen in the N = 50 plot, where results from
numerical simulations are not in accordance with the numerical solution of the mathematical
model. High degree of delity between MC simulations data and numerical solutions of the
model is observed for N > 100.






































Figure 2.2: Eect of the population size N on the steady state density Pss(m)
A caveat on the assumption of large population size should be mentioned here.
Realistically, N cannot be unbounded, since there is a cognitive limit to the number of
people with whom one can maintain social relationship - this is known as the Dunbar number
[67]. It is true that inuence in the world of social network is not completely dictated by
relationships in which an individual knows the identity of each person and how s/he relates
to every other person. For example, the Pew Research Center puts the average number
of friends for a Facebook user at 338 [68]. However, these kinds of social networks rarely
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ever assume a complete graph topology, but can be more realistically modelled as a scale-
free network. Keeping this in mind, and since the derivations in this study rely on the
complete graph assumption, all subsequent results are for an intermediate population size
(N = 100) which is large enough for numerical accuracy, but smaller than the permissible
Dunbar number limit (Nlimit = 150).
2.4.1 Convergence and Indeterminate Zones
This section aims to elaborate on the eect of initial magnetization (m0) on the steady
state of the system. Each result is from 1000 runs of Monte Carlo simulations in which the
magnetization parameter m is treated as a random variable. The rescaled histogram of the
random variable is used to estimate the probability density function of the system at steady
state. Dierent population sizes are considered and simulated with all the possible initial
conditions (m0 varies with steps equal to 2N ).
For ease of representation, the mean magnetization 〈mss〉 estimated from the steady
state PDF, Pss(m), for each simulation is plotted. Although, not the most comprehensive
representation, Fig. 2.3 provides a visual representation of the convergence and indeterminate
zones by representing the behavior of the mean steady state magnetization of systems as
initial magnetization varies.


















(a) N = 50, I+ = 6, I− = 5


















(b) N = 100, I+ = 12, I− = 10


















(c) N = 500, I+ = 60, I− = 50
Figure 2.3: Dependency of the mean steady state magnetization on initial magnetization.
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Figure 2.3 depicts the two regions, convergence and indeterminate zones. The convergence
zone is again composed of two regions - ZC = ZCl ∪ ZCh , where
ZCl =
{









m∗0l < m0 < m
∗
0h
|Pss(m) = ClPssl(m) + ChPssh(m)
}
where Cl > 0, Ch > 0. For dierent congurations of population size and inuences, ZCl




It can be observed that as population size increases, the convergence zone covers
larger intervals of m0. In addition, with linear scaling of simulation parameters, systems
starting from their respective convergence zones converge to the same mean steady state
magnetization value. In other words, for two generic systems α and β, with a scale factor of η,
if (m0α = m0β) ≤ m∗0l or if (m0α = m0β) ≥ m
∗
0h
, then 〈mss(N, I+, I−)〉 = 〈mss(ηN, ηI+, ηI−)〉,
η = 2, 3, 4, . . ..
It may be noted that although the results presented so far are illustrated with the help
of the mean of the stationary distribution, in fact, the hypothesis is that for each α, the
sequence, Pαn (m) converges in distribution to Pss(m), i.e., limn→∞ P
α
n (m) = Pss(m).
To prove this, denoting a system conguration as sys = {N, I+, I−,m0}, the following
null and alternative hypotheses are constructed:
 Null Hypothesis (H0): For sysα and sysβ with Nα = Nβ, I+α = I+β , I−α = I−β , if
(m0α 6= m0β) ≤ m∗0l or if (m0α 6= m0β) ≥ m
∗
0h
then Pαss(m) ∼ P βss(m).
 Alternative Hypothesis (H1): For sysα and sysβ with Nα = Nβ, I+α = I+β , I−α =
I−β , if (m0α 6= m0β) ≤ m∗0l or if (m0α 6= m0β) ≥ m
∗
0h
then Pαss(m)  P βss(m).
Simulation data with dierent m0's are tested at α = 0.01 signicance level using the
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Results of the testing do not reject the null
hypothesis; thus, the null hypothesis stands true with 99% certainty.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates steady state PDF's of a system with dierent initial conditions
(marked by red stars in Fig. 2.4a) for visual verication. It may be noted that when initial
conditions are chosen from ZCh(Figs. 2.4f, g, h), or from ZCl (Figs. 2.4c, d, e), the steady
state PDFs each time converge respectively to Pssl(m) and Pssh(m).
Form∗0l ≤ m0 ≤ m
∗
0h
(Fig. 2.4b), the PDF is a mixture of two PDFs. K-S tests reveal that
the rescaled PDFs of these modes are the same as Pssl and Pssh proving that the solution of
Eqn. 2.10 contains both specic solutions; or equivalently, Cl 6= 0 and Ch 6= 0.
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(a) Conv. Zone for N = 100


















(b) m0 = −0.04















(c) m0 = −0.7















(d) m0 = −0.8





































































(h) m0 = 0.9
Figure 2.4: Conv. zone and stationary PDF's of a system with N = 100, I+ = 12, I− = 10.
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2.4.2 Convergence Zone with Varying Control Inputs
In section 2.4.1, a xed control input is used to nd the convergence zones related to
dierent population sizes. The objective of this section is to investigate whether there exist
convergence zones for other values of u. Also, how such convergence zones depend on the
control input is studied.
To do this, control input u is treated as an independent variable in Fig. 2.5. Similar
to section 2.4.1, MC simulations are performed for all possible combinations of m0 and u.
Then, mean magnetization of the system at the steady state is calculated and plotted.
A specic control input can correspond to dierent combinations of I+ and I−; for e.g.,
I+ = 8, I− = 2 and I+ = 16, I− = 4 both represent u = 0.6. To fully specify the problem, we
dene inuence ratio, λ = I
N
, as a simulation parameter, where |I| = |I+|+ |I−|. Somewhat
arbitrarily, we focus on the range 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 for λ, which regulates the total number of
inuences in the system to be at most the same size as the population. In Fig. 2.5, the
control input changes with steps equal to 2
I
to cover all possible discrete values in [−1, 1].
Existence of convergence zones: Fig. 2.5 depicts that for dierent combinations of λ
and u, region(s) (m0 ≤ m∗0l or m0 ≥ m
∗
0h
) exist, where the mean steady state magnetization
〈mss〉 loses its dependency on the initial magnetization, and all systems converge to a unique
PDF.
To determine boundaries of convergence zones, a new set of gures are presented.
Fig. 2.6a represents the case with λ = 0.2 with markers for m∗0l and m
∗
0h
. Fig. 2.6b is
the two dimensional location of the same markers on the m0 − u plane. As it can be seen,
for most values of the control input, both m∗0l and m
∗
0h
are present. However, in extreme
cases of control input one of them is absent. For example, u = −1 and u = 1 lack m∗0h and
m∗0l respectively. Same analysis can be applied to systems with other values of λ.
Exit probability, i.e. the probability that the system ultimately reaches consensus as
a function of the initial composition of the population, is a very important rst-passage
property [69]. In this work, the concept of exit probability is not completely applicable since





















































































(f) λ = 1
Figure 2.5: Dependency of mean steady state magnetization on initial magnetization and











































Figure 2.6: (a) m∗0l and m
∗
0h
marked on the 3D graph related to λ = 0.2 for all possible
values of u. (b) 2D representation of the boundaries on the m0 − u plane.
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does show some similarities with the concept of exit probability. Here, we have shown
that two similar systems with initial conditions belonging to the same convergence zone
will converge to the same probability distribution in their stationary states. The limits of
convergence zones depend on N, λ, and u.
Eect of inuence ratio (λ): Fig. 2.5a represents an uninuenced society. 〈mss〉 is only
a function of m0, and boundaries of convergence zone are clear on both sides. However, as
soon as inuences are added to the society (λ = 0.2), the behavior of the 〈mss〉 starts to
change, and dependency on u is noticeable. For instance, on plane u = −1, the 〈mss〉s for
positive m0s decrease since all of the inuences are focused on the negative side. Also, on
plane u = 1, the 〈mss〉s for negative m0s increase because all the inuences are focused on
the positive side.
More importantly, at λ = 0.2, number of inuences is not high enough to make the 〈mss〉
atten as m0 changes on planes u = ±1. This is the reason why there is neither a m∗0h on
plane u = −1 nor a m∗0l on u = 1. However, for higher values of λ, number of inuences is
high enough to overcome the eect of m0 and make the 〈mss〉 atten (Figs. 2.5c-f).
In Figs. 2.5c-e, as λ increases, the control input becomes the dominant parameter
in changing the behavior of 〈mss〉, and 〈mss〉 completely loses its dependency on m0 as
u −→ ±1. In addition, when u −→ 0, m0 is the dominant parameter in the behavior of
〈mss〉. Interestingly, Fig. 2.5f, 〈mss〉 is a function of u only. It is interesting to note that
when the inuence size (I) exactly matches the population size (N) the steady state PDF
completely loses its dependency on the initial condition.
Comparison to previous studies: In the study by Slanina and Lavi£ka [27], it is proven
that for a simplied Sznajd model dynamic on a complete graph, there exists a phase
transition at m0 = 0. However, in our simulations this phase transition is absent in Fig. 2.5.
In the case of λ = 0, this is due to the fact that, in their analyses, Slanina and Lavi£ka
assume the population size is innite, N → ∞; however, in our simulations we assume the
population is large but nite. In cases where λ 6= 0, the absence of a phase transition is
partly because of the large but nite N assumption, and in part because of the presence of
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inuences.
Linear scaling property: In section 2.4.1, the linear scaling property with a xed control
input is mentioned. In this section, we investigate if this property holds true for other values
of control input. Fig. 2.7 compares the behavior of 〈mss〉 for two population sizes N = 50 and
N = 100 (η = 2). From visual inspection, linear scaling of simulation parameters preserves
the general trend of 〈mss〉.
However, point-to-point comparison of 〈mss〉 data shows that the relation 〈mss(N, I+, I−)〉 =
〈mss(ηN, ηI+, ηI−)〉 does not hold true for all values of u. To determine the interval of control
input for which the scalability property stands, we study the point-to-point dierence in
〈mss〉 data values. Fig. 2.7c represents δ = 〈mss〉|N=50 − 〈mss〉|N=100 calculated on planes
m0 = −1 (blue line) and m0 = +1 (red line).
It can be seen that for some values of u, 〈mss〉 of the scaled system (N = 100) and the
base system (N = 50) are exactly equal (δ = 0); thus, for the corresponding m0 scalability
property stands. For instance, if λ = 0.2, for ∀u ∈ [−1, 0.4], δ = 0 on plane m0 = −1 (the
green area). For a unique m0, intervals of control input for which δ = 0 will be referred to
as the Scalability Zone of the base system for that m0.
To study the existence of scalability zone for dierent values of initial magnetization, the
same process has been applied to 〈mss〉 data on other available m0 planes. Fig. 2.8 presents




























(b) N = 100, λ = 0.2





(c) Scalability zone for m0 = ±1
with λ = 0.2
























































(e) λ = 1
Figure 2.8: Scalability zone for all m0s for N = 100.
dierent values of λ regarding existence of scalability zone and its expansion, maximum
dierence values, and sign of δ.
It can be seen in Fig. 2.8a that for some values of m0 close to zero δ 6= 0. However,
scalability zone appears and expands in the rst and third quadrants of the m0 − u plane
(where sgn(m0) = sgn(u)) towards outer borders. In this gure, dependency of δ on m0 is
clear in a large area. Also, maximum dierence happens in the second and fourth quadrants
near the outer borders (where sgn(m0) = −sgn(u)).
As λ increases, the dependency of δ on m0 decreases; maximum dierences decrease, and
they happen close to u = 0 plane. The scalability zone is available for all values of m0.
When λ = 1, δ is a function of u only. Interestingly, sgn(δ) = sgn(u) = −sgn(m0) for all
values of λ. This means that for m0 ≥ 0, δ < 0⇒ 〈mss〉|N=50 < 〈mss〉|N=100 if δ(m0, u) 6= 0,
or for m0 ≤ 0, δ > 0⇒ 〈mss〉|N=50 > 〈mss〉|N=100 if δ(m0, u) 6= 0.
So far, our ndings are dominantly based on the mean of the probability distribution
function of the system at its steady state; however, while calculating the mean, some
information of the PDF is lost. For instance, although a family of Gaussian distributions
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2σ2 have a mean value of zero, their disorder or uncertainty cannot
be explained by their mean. In information theory the concept of Entropy is used to study
the uncertainty of PDFs. Next section is devoted to the study of system entropy at steady
state.
2.4.3 Entropy Analysis
Entropy of a random variable X is dened as the expectation of the random variable
− logP (X) with respect to the probability measure P [70, 71]:




where, EP denotes the expectation with respect to probability distribution P . We use the
steady state magnetization PDF of the systems in Fig. 2.5 to calculate entropy of each data
point. Fig. 2.9 represents the entropy of the system for dierent values of inuence ratio. It
is worth noting that low entropy corresponds to higher certainty and high entropy represents






































































































(f) λ = 1
Figure 2.9: Entropy of distributions for dierent values of λ for N = 100.
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For λ = 0, there are no inuences in the population, and entropy of the system is a
function of m0 only. Entropy is zero for m0 ≤ m∗0l or m0 ≥ m
∗
0h
because in these regions
there are enough agents at the corresponding state to push the system PDF towards a Dirac
delta function at either −1 for m0 ≤ m∗0l or at +1 when m0 ≥ m
∗
0h
. Also, entropy reaches
its maximum at m0 = 0, because in this region neither of the groups in ±1 states are strong
enough to completely attract the population towards themselves; this phenomenon results
in a more distributed density function over the magnetization axis, and consequently higher
entropy.
Figures 2.9b-f depict that adding inuences to the population increases the entropy of the
system. The reason is that although small in number, inuences are capable of attracting
agents to their state; as a result, the steady state magnetization of the system will have
a dierent value from that of the uninuenced population. So, the density function of the
system becomes more distributed over the magnetization axis leading to higher entropy
values.
For instance, u = 0|λ=0.2 represents a system with inuences equally divided between the
two groups; this might imply that their eects on the steady state PDF will be eliminated
by each other, and the resulted PDF will be the same as that of the uninuenced system
(λ = 0). However, by point-to-point comparison of data points we nd that ∀m0 on the
u = 0 plane, the PDF of the inuenced system is more distributed, and H(m0, u = 0)|λ=0 <
H(m0, u = 0)|λ=0.2.
In Fig. 2.9b, entropy is at its lowest levels when sgn(m0) = sgn(u). In this situation
higher number of inuences support the initially more populated state resulting in a sharp
less-distributed magnetization density function close to one of the ends of the magnetization
axis. The opposite happens when sgn(m0) = −sgn(u) since more inuences are in the favor
of the initially less populated state preventing the population from clustering at one of the
edges of the magnetization axis; the resulting density function is nicely distributed causing
higher entropy. This reasoning explains why the point (m0 = 0, u = 0) is similar to a saddle
point. It is observed in Fig. 2.9b that entropy is more sensitive to the control input rather
than the initial condition. Consider point (m0 = −1, u = −1) on the graph. Entropy starts
to propagate from zero faster if {m0 = const. and u ↑} compared to the situation where
33
{u = const. and m0 ↑}. The reason is that inuences (even in small numbers) are always
active in the process of changing agents' states to theirs. However, an agent is active in
attracting other agents to its initial state till s/he changes to the opposite state; i.e. its
eect is not ever-lasting. As a result, more agents are needed to have the same eect of a
few number of inuences on the PDF of the system and the entropy.
In Fig. 2.9b, as u increases on m0 = −1 plane, entropy ascends till u = 0.9. This
phenomenon is easy to comprehend since more inuences in state +1 attract more agents
from state −1, and the PDF of the system is more distributed. However, at u = 1, since all
the inuences are at the positive side, they are able to dramatically shift the PDF towards
themselves and make it narrower resulting in lower entropy value. Here, the number of
inuences is not high enough to change the PDF into a Dirac delta function, so entropy does
not reach zero.
On the contrary, in Figures 2.9c-f, number of inuences is high enough to completely
attract the population towards themselves on planes u = ±1; so, the entropy is zero. As λ
increases, similar to 〈mss〉, for larger intervals of u entropy loses its dependency on m0 and
sgn(m0), and the saddle point disappears; for λ = 1, entropy depends on the control input
only.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, eects of external inuences on the behavioral dynamic of a group of agents
who interact with each other based on the Sznajd model are studied. The Sznajd model
is formulated on a complete graph in presence of inuences, and the governing dierential
equation for the population behavior at steady state is derived. The resulted ODE shows
the dependency of pe(m) on population size N , control input u =
I+−I−
I
, and total inuence
size I.
The mathematical model is numerically solved, and the results are compared with data
from numerical simulations. Higher peak values and lower variances are observed for larger
population sizes. We nd good agreement between the results from numerical experiments
and numerical solution of the mathematical model for network sizes exceeding N = 100.
34
Based on numerical simulations, regions (called convergence zone) are available where
the steady state loses its dependency on the initial condition. By adopting Kolmogorov-
Smirnov hypothesis testing method, it is proven with 99% certainty that steady state PDF's
of systems with initial conditions belonging to the same convergence zone are equivalent.
Dierent graphs are provided to display this phenomenon. A relationship based on these
ndings and the general solution of the stationary ODE is drawn for dierent ranges of
m0. Furthermore, results show that by increasing the population size, the convergence zone
covers a larger area. Interestingly, it is observed that linear scaling of simulation parameters
causes the same convergence value for the mean steady state magnetization.
Eect of the control input on convergence zones is studied on three dimensional graphs
by dening a new parameter λ = I
N
named inuence ratio. Results show that for dierent
combinations of u and λ, convergence zone(s) exist. Figures are provided to show the
boundaries of the convergence zones. It is shown that increase in the number of inuences
results in larger convergence zones. When λ = 1, the whole m0 − u plane is independent
of m0. In addition, the absence of a phase transition is explained by the large-but-nite
population size assumption and presence of inuences.
Linear scaling property is also investigated for all combinations of m0 and u. It is shown
that not for all values of the control input the mentioned property stands. Three dimensional
gures are provided which show the dependency of the dierence between the 〈mss〉's of two
linearly scaled systems for dierent λ's. In general, as inuence ratio increases, δ decreases;
and δ loses dependency on m0. The reason behind high values of δ on the second and fourth
quadrants of the m0−u plane is discussed in detail. It is also shown that for negative initial
conditions, the 〈mss〉 of the base system is higher than that of the scaled system.
Entropy study of the system reveals that higher inuence (although small in number)
equals higher entropy. Generally, entropy is a function of the initial magnetization and the
control input, but as λ increases, the system loses its dependency on m0. When λ = 1 the
entropy is only a function of the control input.
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Chapter 3
Dynamics of a Repulsive Voter Model
3.1 Objective
In literature, all of the interaction models are attracting models; i.e. after the interaction,
the interacting agents become the same (Voter model and Sznajd model), or similar to each
other in some sense (Bounded Condence model). However, attracting interaction models
are not capable of explaining all types of behaviors observed in the society. For example,
anti-conformal behavior cannot be modelled using attracting interaction models. To model
anti-conformal behaviors in the society, new types of interaction models, repelling models,
are needed. This chapter introduces a new interaction model where similar agents repel each
other instead of attracting each other.
3.2 Intorduction
In contrast to the rich and well-researched mode of conventional social interaction, in this
chapter, we discuss a modied scenario where, each node is repelled, rather than attracted by
its neighbors. Such anti-conformal behavior, though not nearly as wide-spread as `herding' or
mimicking behavior, is exhibited in a variety of social situations where there is a premium on
novelty or on choices which can demonstrate an attitude of indierence or rebellion towards
current trends. In the 1950s, a minimalist style described as `anti-fashion' emerged with
the advent of rock and roll, especially with young adolescent women [72]. Instead of the
36
standard dress or skirt, many young women wore jeans and plaid or T-shirts in rebellion
with the gender roles and societal norms at that time. This fashion has the roots of many
modern anti-fashion trends, such as Grunge [72], decades later.
A more recent example of anti-conformal behavior is observed by analyzing the beer
drinking trend in America's young adults. Preference to beers in youths aged 18 to 29 has
dropped from 75% to 40% in the last twenty years [73]. It is hypothesized that a cause of
this shift in drinking preference is due to young people rebelling against the tastes of the
generation before them - because what their parents drink isn't "cool".
We also draw inspiration from a behavioral demand model to trigger lane-changing
maneuver of drivers in a multi-lane highway. When confronted with a slower car in the same
lane, in the absence of other external factors, drivers tend to change to the other `emptier'
lane. This behavior exemplies the repulsive Voter model dynamics that is introduced,
described and analyzed in this chapter, albeit at a very low level of abstraction.
In this chapter, we introduce the simplest case, analogous to the Voter model, where at
any time, each node has only two discrete states +1 and −1; thus, a single variable si = ±1
fully species the state of node i. This Ising model based approach is not intended to model
any real phenomena, rather allow a mathematical treatment of a new emergent phenomena,
where simple interactions among agents lead to complex global behaviors.
In this chapter, section 2 introduces the Repulsive Voter Model (RVM), and discusses it in
the context of a complete graph. We derive the equilibrium solution of the Master equation
related to our model formulated on a complete graph, which reveals some interesting facts
about the role of the inuencing nodes on the convergence state, time to convergence, etc.
This is then validated by numerical simulations in section 3, the theoretical results are
compared with numerical simulations, and several interesting characteristics of the system
are pointed out. Section 4 presents the derivation of the Master equation for the Repulsive
Voter model with biased nodes on a random graph with connection probability p. In this part
also, numerical simulations are conducted not only to validate the mathematical modeling
but also to perform a sensitivity analysis on the connection probability of p. Section 5
is dedicated to analytical solution of the Repulsive Voter model on a regular lattice. The
analytical solution demonstrates some interesting results of the time evolution of the system.
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In the nal section of this chapter, the ndings from this chapter are summarized and the
chapter is concluded.
3.3 The Repulsive Voter Model Dynamics
In this section, a complete graph is considered. The complete graph, being a fully connected
random graph G(N, p) in the limit p → 1, can be conveniently characterized by a single
parameter, the magnetization factor, dened as m = (N+ −N−)/N , where, at any instant,
N+ represents the number of nodes (agents) in state +1, and N− represents the number of
nodes of the network in state −1. N = N+ +N− nodes make up the vertices of the graph.
The Repulsive Voter model dynamics is a straightforward modication of the standard
Voter model. At each time step, a node i and one of its neighbors j are randomly selected,
and si is set equal to −sj, i.e. node i chooses the opposite state as its neighbor. Several
social behaviors nd parallel in this anti-conforming tendency in a group, a typical example
being lane selection in heavy trac. Although not accurate at a ne level of granularity,
an analysis of the dynamics can provide valuable information regarding the steady state
equilibrium distribution, its dependence on group size and stabilization time.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the instantaneous composition of the population which, in
addition to N+ and N− nodes, comprises of I = I+ + I− external agents with respective
pre-conceived allegiance to states +1 and −1. In the repulsive interaction scenario, the



















Figure 3.1: (a) An example demonstrating trac ow modelled with the Repulsive Voter
dynamics, (b) Population composition
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order to attain a target state distribution. Natural examples of such repulsive inuences in
a trac network are police vehicles stationed near accidents or construction sites in order to
attain smooth uninhibited trac ow [74, 75] through reduced number of lanes.
We use the same nomenclature as Slanina and Lavicka to develop the Master equation for
the RVM dynamics. A Master equation is a set of rst-order dierential equations describing






T (m|m′)P (m′, t)−
∑
m6=m′
T (m′|m)P (m, t) (3.1)
where, the quantity T (m|m′) is the transition rate, and is only dened for m 6= m′. It may
be noted that, in our case, the system performs a random walk over a [−1,+1] range of the
magnetization parameter m with a discrete step size of ±2/N . For such a one step process,
the master equation takes the simpler form:
dP (m, t)
dt
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We can now proceed to compose the master equation as:
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Dening the control variable as u = I+−I−
I
, for large N , after simplication, the Master
equation can be expressed as:
Ṗm =
1










With the proper time scaling as τ = t/N , the nal form of the inuenced Repulsive Voter


















If we assume that an equilibrium density function exists, then limτ→∞ ∂Pm∂τ = 0, and by



















where C is the constant that ensures proper normalization of the probability density function.
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The eect of inuences is apparent both in the exponential term in the numerator and in
the power of the denominator. Putting I = 0 results in the solution of the Repulsive Voter
model without inuence.
3.4 Discussion and Numerical Results
We can estimate the probability density functions at each time (decision) point simply with
a rescaled histogram by performing Monte Carlo simulations and treating the magnetization
parameter m as a random variable. We expect Eqn. 3.9 to accurately represent the density
estimates at the steady state and provide us with insights into some characteristics of this
interesting system such as the expected equilibrium magnetization, eect of N , I, u, etc.
3.4.1 The Equilibrium Density
It may be noted that Pe(m) from the analytical solution is not independent of N for large but
nite population sizes. Thus, for bigger populations to reach similar expected magnetization
levels, more control (bigger u) has to be exerted. This is in stark contrast to the regular
Voter model with inuence, where the mean magnetization was shown to be independent of
the population size [8].
To investigate the dependence of Pe(m) onN , we plotted probability densities for a variety
of population sizes. Numerical results from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations are overlayed on
the analytical solutions for each N in Fig. 3.2a. Larger populations are characterized by
lower variance and mean magnetization close to 0. The assumption of large N lower bounds
the population size. This may be observed in the N = 10 plot where the data points from
MC are not in accordance to the theoretical result obtained in Eqn. 3.9. High degrees of
delity between MC simulation data and analytical result is observed for N > 100.
Expected Magnetization
The eect of size of dierent inuence groups on the equilibrium density is shown in Fig.
3.2b along with the expected magnetization 〈m〉 plotted as vertical lines. It is observed that
the Repulsive Voter model is extremely stable in the sense that even high values of u and I
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Magnetization(m)











































































Figure 3.2: (a) Eect of the population size (N) on the equilibrium density Pe(m), and
(b) Eect of size of inuence groups on Pe(m)
are not be able to cause noticeable shifts in 〈m〉. In smaller populations, however, the eect
is much more pronounced. Recalling the signicant shift in the beer drinking preference in
youths, we may observe that this is one case, where the inuencing set (parents) is similar
in size to the target population. Without such large inuence, signicant shifts in the mean
magnetization is impossible to achieve.
An interesting behavior for the system is observed if the inuences I+ and I− are scaled
proportionally with the population size. Figure 3.3 shows the eect of the scale factor α.
Interestingly, 〈m〉 is independent of α, i.e.:
〈m(N, I+, I−)〉 = 〈m(αN, αI+, αI−)〉
This result may have practical use in planning trac management strategies in congested
highways using police vehicles. The results suggest that if I = 5 police cars were sucient to
achieve the mean target lane distribution for a N = 100 car capacity section of a highway, in
a N ′ = 5×100 = 500 car capacity highway section, I ′ = 5×5 = 25 police cars would achieve
the same mean lane distribution. However, the variance monotonically decreases with scale.
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α=Scaled size(N/100)























Figure 3.3: Eect of scale factor on the mean and variance of Pe(m)
3.4.2 Progression of the Density Function
So far, only aspects of the system at its equilibrium point have been presented. Now, we
investigate the dynamic characteristics of the probability density function; specically, the
eect of the inuence groups I+ and I−.
Figure 3.4a plots the progression of the PDF for such a numerical experiment with
simulation parameters N = 200, I+ = 1 and I− = 9. Starting from a delta distribution
p(m)|τ=0 = δ(m−0.8), the gure gives a snapshot of the distribution at time instants spaced
in a geometric sequence. The choice of the time instants displayed are purely based on
aesthetic considerations. The plots with the empty circles are scaled histograms from 1000
simulation runs at the corresponding scaled time points, while the solid lines are the normal
distributions t to the data. An important observations from these plots is that starting
from a delta, the distribution at each instant quickly assumes and remains in the Gaussian
form, which should help policy making by providing suitable condence bounds for achieving
target distributions within a certain time frame.
Figure 3.4b plots the expected magnetization trajectory 〈m〉 with τ . It can be readily
seen that the convergence time is independent of the population size N if time is scaled
as τ = t/N . This implies that the number of interactions it takes for the Repulsive Voter
dynamical system to reach equilibrium is proportional to the size of the population. This
means that for N = 20, if the time (number of decisions) to convergence is t = 60, then for
N ′ = 200, the convergence time is simply t′ = 600. Even at this very low level of delity,
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Figure 3.4: (a) Progression of the PDF with time for N = 200, I+ = 5 and I− = 2, (b)
Eect of N on the time to convergence
this information can be potentially useful in a variety of situations including the design of
merge sections in highways.
3.5 RVM on a Random Graph
In this part, behavior of the RVM on a random graph is investigated. The Erd®s Rényi
random graph G(N, p) is dened as N labeled nodes connected by n edges which are chosen
randomly from (N(N − 1))/2 possible edges [55]; i.e. every pair of nodes is connected with
probability p = n
[(N(N−1))/2] . Since there are C
n
[(N(N−1))/2] ways to construct such a graph, a
probability space is formed in which every realization of the random graph owns an equal
probability of happening. The probability of constructing a specic realization of a random
graph such as G0 with the specications mentioned above is P (G0) = pn(1− p)[N(N−1))/2]−n.
3.5.1 Model Formulation and Analytical Solution
In order to formulate this system, elements of the Master equation do not need to be
composed again. Intuitively, every interaction happens with probability p, so all parts of the
Master equation are going to be the same as the case involving complete graph with the only
exception that they will incorporate a probability coecient. Here, only one representative
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transition rate is presented to clarify the eect of connection probability of the random
graph:








N+ + I+ − 1
N + I − 1
)
.p (3.10)
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∂m
+ 2NPm + IPm
] (3.11)
The nal form of the inuenced Repulsive Voter model on a random graph can be
expressed in an exactly similar form as Eqn. 3.9; the only dierence is that the time needs








3.5.2 Numerical Results and Discussion
Since eects of population size N and dierent combinations of inuences I+ and I− have
already been considered in the complete graph scenario, this part will solely be devoted to
demonstrating the eects of connection probability p on the behavior of the system in the
equilibrium state as quantied by Eqn. 3.12. Figure 3.5 illustrates results of Monte Carlo
simulations for dierent population sizes N and for two dierent values of the connection
probability p. The results are overlayed on the analytical solutions associated with each
system.
In Fig. 3.5a, p is greater than pc =
ln(N)
N
for N = 50, 100 and 200, the random graphs
in these cases are almost surely connected and consequently, the analytical solutions and
numerical results represent high degrees of similarity. However, for N = 10, p < pc leading
to development of isolated nodes which cause the equilibrium density to deviate from the
analytical solution. In Fig. 3.5b, for each N , the connection probability is smaller than
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(a) p = 0.1
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(b) p = 0.01
Figure 3.5: Eect of connection probability p on the equilibrium density for dierent N
the threshold leading to large deviations. This indicates the presence of a critical connection
probability (pc) and possible phase transition in the expected equilibrium magnetization 〈m〉,
which we hypothesize should coincide with the phase transition related to the emergence of
fully connected random graphs at p ε→0−−→ (1 + ε) lnN
N
.
Figure 3.6 is the result of such investigation where the equilibrium magnetization 〈m〉
is plotted against the average degree of the graph 〈k〉 ≈ pN . We may point out that in
this case, inuence size is I = 0 and consequently, the analytical solution would predict the
expected equilibrium magnetization 〈m〉 = 0. It can be inferred from the graph that there
exists a 〈kc〉 ≈ lnN above which the mean equilibria of the systems do reach 〈m〉 = 0 mean
magnetization, and they are perfectly aligned with the analytical results. For N = 50, 100
and 200, the critical degree 〈kc〉 = 3.9, 4.6 and 5.3 respectively, which qualitatively match
the critical average degree observed in Fig. 3.6; beyond these critical values the expected
equilibrium magnetizations converge to 〈m〉 = 0.
The signicant dierence of analytical solution on a random graph and a complete graph
is the way the time parameter is scaled. It has already been shown that on a complete graph
if the time is scaled as τ = t/N , the convergence time is independent of the population size.
On a random graph, with time scaled as τ = t/(N/p) the convergence time is independent
of p as well as N . Figure 3.7 demonstrates this behavior. For the case with p = 0.01, since
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Figure 3.6: Eect of average degree 〈k〉 on the mean equilibrium density for dierent
population sizes
the connection probability of the graph is lower than pc, the system converges to a nite
non-zero value of expected magnetization.
Essentially, this exercise and the preceding results provide us with the means of
analytically predicting the mean value of magnetization with which the RVM system will
stabilize and the convergence time when the network existing between the participating
nodes can be modelled as a random graph. More importantly, we can determine the range
of parameters where this analysis is meaningful. The random graph is a step closer to real
networks between individuals.
3.6 RVM on a Lattice
Lattices are regular arrangements of points in the Euclidean space, and their applications
are found in the analyses of various phenomena related to networked environments such
as crystal formation, opinion evolution in societies, etc. Considerable attention has been
given to the study of the Voter model on lattices and how such systems tend to organize
into a single-opinion state in the absence of inexible agents (or inuences) [76]. In this
section, rst, the RVM is formulated and solved analytically on a one-dimensional lattice










































Figure 3.7: Eect of connection probability on convergence time of a system with N = 100
and τ = t/(N/p)
On a regular lattice, based on the RVM, the rate at which the state of agent x changes











in which the sum is done over the nearest neighbors of site x. This rate is simply the
probability of state transformation based on an agent's nearest neighbors' states. z is the
coordination number of the graph and is assumed to be constant; i.e. periodic boundary
conditions apply.
Clearly, transition rate of agent x is a linear function of the fraction of the agreeing
neighbors. For instance, when an agent and all his neighbors agree, the transition rate
is one, conversely, if all the neighbors disagree, the transition rate is zero. In contrast to
previous sections where we studied the whole system using a magnetization factor, in this
part, mean spin of an agent at point x namely S(x) = 〈s(x)〉 is studied to represent the
individual behavior throughout the interaction process.
If a change of opinion happens at x, based on RVM, s(x, t+1) = −s(x, t); as a result, the
opinion at x changes by s(x, t + 1) − s(x, t) = −2s(x, t). Based on the previously obtained





In the rest of the modeling, we will use s(x) as a substitute to s(x, t) for simplicity. By






in which ei are the unit vectors of the lattice. The solution of this linear dierential equation
will reveal the temporal behavior of an agent at node x. This dierential equation can
be solved by introducing a one-dimensional Fourier transform considering x as the spatial
variable and employing a generating function representation of the Bessel function Iν(Z) for
a part of the solution. The time evolution of the mean opinion of an agent at point x in one
dimension becomes:
S(x, t) = Ix(−t)e−t (3.16)
For simplicity, the initial condition of S(x, t = 0) = δ(x, 0) is considered; that is, we
start with a single +1 opinion (or spin) in a background population of undecided voters. It
is important to note that the rst agent is positioned at x = 0. The interested reader can
refer to [76] for full details of the inspiration of this solution. For the general d-dimensional











Utilizing such a transition rate along with adopting a d-dimensional Fourier transform
(one for each dimension), following the previous steps and assuming the same initial
conditions, the time evolution of the mean opinion of an agent at point x(x1, x2, ..., xd)
will be:
S(x, t) = Πdi=1Ixi(−t)e−dt (3.18)
Analytical solutions have been plotted for nodes at sites x = 0, x = 1 and x = 2 on a
one-dimensional lattice in Fig. 3.8. The results demonstrate how the mean opinion changes
at the rst 3 nodes in an innitely long 1−d lattice. The blue plot for site x = 0 starts from
1 because the initial condition is assumed to be S(x, t = 0) = δ(x, 0). It starts decreasing
immediately because of its interaction with node at x = 1. The node at x = 1 itself starts to
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of mean opinion in nodes at sites x = 0, x = 1 and x = 2
dip below 0 because, out of its two neighbors, the node at x = 0 is more likely to be +1 and
that interaction drives node at x = 1 opinion towards the −1 state. The eect is reversed
for node at x = 2 and the oscillatory pattern continues for increasing node indeces.
The RVM on a lattice, as discussed above, can closely replicate the dynamics of trac
ow and lane change in a 2-lane highway. Before any interactions occur, the leading car (at
node x = 0) has no reason to occupy the faster lane, hence almost surely, his state is +1.
The rest of the cars (at nodes 2, 3, ... are equiprobably occupying either of the two available
lanes (states ±1). This gives rise to the initial condition, S(x, t = 0) = δ(x, 0). As soon
as the cars start to interact, the mean choice for car at node 0 starts to shift towards an
equilibrium value of 0, while that of node 2 dips below 0.
An interesting feature to note is that, the `wave' for node 2 is phase-lagged from the
wave for node 1, node 3 lags node 2 and so on. Also, the eect diminishes away from the
seed node at site x = 0. The reason to this lagging behavior could be found in the initial
condition and in the exponentially decaying behavior of the analytical solution.
To get a visual understanding of opinion evolution in lattices, a set of experiments were
conducted on a two-dimensional lattice. Results of the experiments are presented in Fig.
3.9. White squares represent +1 state, and the black ones represent the −1 state. The
system starts from the initial condition m0 = 0.8 which is the reason there are more white
squares than black ones in Fig. 3.9a. Through interactions the system is pushed towards its
equilibrium state of zero magnetization. Eventually, a checkerboard-pattern is observed for
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(a) Step 0 (b) Step 10,000 (c) Step Step 5,000,000
(d) Step 50,000,000 (e) Step 100,000,000 (f) Step 150,000,000
Figure 3.9: Opinion diusion in a two-dimensional lattice
the converged system, as expected. Figure 3.10 show the progression of the magnetization
factor of the system at dierent time steps.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a new interaction model has been introduced where each node repels rather
than attracts its neighbors. First, the model is formulated on a complete graph and solved
under the eect of inuences at equilibrium. The equilibrium density pe(m) is derived as a
function of the population size N , total inuence size I and the control input u = I+−I−
I
.
Then, the model is studied on a random graph with connection probability p. Analytical
solutions for such a network is also derived at equilibrium point. Finally, the behavior of
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Figure 3.10: Magnetization versus time on the two-dimensional lattice
the model on a regular lattice is investigated which is followed by the analytical solutions
for the system on a general d-dimensional lattice.
In the case of complete graph, even though the repulsive dynamics proved to be very
stable around the zero magnetization state, some interesting characteristics were observed.
The expected equilibrium magnetization is dependent on the population size as well as
the size of the positive and negative inuences, but it is invariant when all three are
scaled identically. The distribution variance is a monotonically decreasing function of the
population size. The time to convergence scales proportionately with the population size
and is independent of inuences. The validity of analytical results has been checked by
means of extensive numerical simulations. We found good agreement between the results
from numerical experiments and analytical results for network sizes exceeding N = 100.
For a random graph, it is shown that by modifying the time scaling, the same PDE may
be obtained. On this network, too, the equilibrium density is dependent on the network size,
number of inuences, and the control input. However, the eect of connection probability is
traceable only in the scaled time. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations veried that there exists
a critical value of the connection probability p above which the existence of a fully connected
graph facilitated the spread of opinion leading to a zero mean equilibrium magnetization.
Finally, it is concluded that the convergence time of the model on a random graph is
independent of both population size and connection probability only if the time is scaled
as τ = t/(N/p).
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Finally, analytical treatment of the Repulsive Voter model on a multi-dimensional lattice
provided some interesting insight into the time evolution of mean opinion at every site in
the lattice.
It is important to note that the nontrivial phenomenology we have witnessed in this
chapter may lead to decision aids in design and policy making. However this is only valid
under the strict assumptions of the Voter dynamics and simplied graph topology considered
in this system. To address this issue and expand the applicability of the results, future
studies should adopt the solution for more complex decision space and more realistic diusion
characteristics of opinions. Another important investigation area can be the application of
the RVM dynamics on dierent network topologies, such as the conguration model, the
small world topology and the scale free network.
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Chapter 4
Eect of Zealots on the Opinion
Dynamics of Rational Agents with
Bounded Condence
4.1 Objective
In the previous two chapters, we were able to mathematically model opinion evolution on
dierent networks based on dierent interaction models (the Sznajd model and the Repulsive
Voter model). These models have a few limitations:
 They are dened over a two-state opinion space (up vs down spins, or +1 vs −1).
 If interaction conditions are met, change of opinion in the agent is certain.
 Eects of environmental eects such as news and mass media cannot be included.
 Society level statistics are studied and individual level decision dynamics are ignored.
In this chapter, we try to develop a decision making algorithm which can include multiple
states (instead of two) in the opinion space. Also, in this algorithm, change of opinion after
interaction is not guaranteed. The algorithm can include eects of environmental stimuli.
Additionally, the algorithm can track individuals' desire to change their opinions.
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4.2 Introduction
To study the eect of social inuence and interaction on emergent behavior, a statistical
physics approach deals with a single basic question of social dynamics: how do local
interactions between social agents create order out of an initial disordered situation? Much
theoretical eorts have been devoted to clarify the implications on the macroscopic outcomes
among other aspects of dierent interaction mechanisms (modelled by the Voter model [77],
Sznajd model [27], Bounded Condence model [78, 33, 79], as well as dierent topologies of
the interaction networks (such as the complete graph, Erd®s Rényi random graphs [55], the
Watts-Strogatz small world network [80, 81], and the Barabási-Albert scale free topology
[82]).
In all the above-mentioned models, opinions are modelized as numbers, integer or
real. Each agent is initialized with a random number as their representative opinions.
As interactions proceed, the agents rearrange their opinion variables, through mutual
discussions. At some stage, the system reaches a conguration which is stable under the
chosen dynamics; this nal conguration may represent consensus with all agents sharing the
same opinion, polarization with two main clusters of opinions (parties), or fragmentation
where several opinion clusters survive. In all such evolutionary models of societies, the
detailed behavior of each human, inherently the complex outcome of many internal processes,
is largely overlooked. This gross simplication is justied by assuming that only higher level
features such as symmetries, dimensionality, and topology of the interaction network are
relevant for the global behavior of the society rather than microscopic details of individual
motives, perceptions, and judgments.
In this chapter, we try to bridge this gap between microscopic and macroscopic studies
of emergent behavior using an Agent-Based Model (ABM) in presence of inuences. We
incorporate individual judgment and decision mechanism parameterized as a Probabilistic
Finite State Automata (PFSA) while observing the eect of interactions between these PFSA
models and inuences linked through a Barabási-Albert scale free network. The basic idea
behind this PFSA-based discrete choice model (DCM) is that each decision maker chooses
from a nite set of alternatives to maximize the potential cumulative reward s/he can collect
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over several steps in the future, Fig. 4.1. The perceived reward for the dierent choices
are negotiated by each individual through interaction with a subset of her/his neighbors
whose reward values do not dier from hers/his by more than a chosen threshold (condence
bound).
To do so, we consider a society whose population are indecisive about supporting their
government or opposing it by joining the rebellion group. The population includes a few
inuences who try to convince the population to join the rebellion group. We have created
a setup which enables individuals to interact with other agents in their network, take into
account dierent actions of the government, and then decide which of the two groups they
should join or remain indecisive.
Section 2 discusses the PFSA-based discrete choice model used in this chapter. Section 3
explains elements of the social computation such as the interaction model and the network
topology. Section 4 presents the results obtained from simulations along with necessary
















External Events Effect of Interactions
Internal Events
PFSA
New State  
C
om
putation of global param
eters
Figure 4.1: Schematic of the interaction between PFSA based individual logic mechanisms
and the society. At each decision step, an individual chooses the most attractive state based
on a utility maximization principle. This choice inuences the reward estimates of each of
his neighbors within his condence bounds, who in turn choose the most attractive state.
This cycle of interaction and reward update continues till equilibrium is reached.
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4.3 Individual Decision Making Algorithms (IDMAs)
Assumption 1. Finite set of discrete choices
At each instant, every individual in the network is faced with the same set of nite discrete
choices  for example, to vote for political candidate `A' or `B' or not to vote at all [83]. In
Markov Decision Modeling [84] as well as in the current framework, the problem is posed
as nding the optimal choice policy for maximizing the rewards gained as a result of one's
own choices. It may be noted that this marks a departure from the usual setting in which
the Krause and Hegselmann bounded condence model is studied. To a degree, our model
resembles the study of vector opinion dynamics such as those done by Axelrod [85] and
several studies by Jacobmeier [86] and Fortunato et al. [87]. In vector opinion dynamics,
the opinion has an integer number of components and the agents occupying the sites of a
network communicate within the KH framework.
Assumption 2. Rational perspective
Individuals are assumed to be rational. This means they order the states into which they
can reach, and they maximize something, reward function in the case of this chapter [83].
Subscription to the rational perspective does not suggest similar reactions from individuals
under the same inuence. But, it creates a rational structure for individuals' behavior. Since
this behavioral logic will be encoded as a Probabilistic Finite State Automaton (PFSA) in
the next section, rational perspective permits pairs of states without authorized transitions
to exist.
Assumption 3. Probabilistic individual decisions
In the IDMA, decision making is not assumed to be a deterministic phenomenon, i.e. we
assume that even when provided with the same conditions and reward vectors, dierent
individuals may choose dierent decisions, and even the same individual can choose
dierently on dierent occasions [83]. The only constraint is that the choices should conform
with the rational perspective (Assumption 2).
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Assumption 4. Two kinds (external and internal (ε)) of events
External/global events simultaneously aect all individuals often resulting in uncontrollable
large scale transitions in the society as a whole. In contrast, internal/local events represent
the individuals' personal choices.
4.3.1 Normative Perspective Modelled as a Probabilistic Finite
State Automata (PFSA)
The assumption of rational perspective allows individual behavior to be encoded as a PFSA.
Even though the IDMA described in the last section is a generic mathematical structure
which can be used to model various scenarios of emergent opinions, in this work, we study
the specic case of a society in the cusp of a rebellion against the existing ruling power. In our
simplied depiction of the situation, each individual faces the internal decision of supporting
the existing government, supporting the rebelling group, or remaining in a state of indecision.
Additionally, the individual can reach a state of political advantage, or disadvantage, but
the uncontrollable transition to these two states can only occur through an external event,
namely, the success or failure of the revolution. The ve PFSA states and events are described
in table 4.1.
Figure 4.2 gives a schematic of the assumed rational perspective encoded as a PFSA. It
may be noticed that transitions such as g : G → R or g : I → R are unauthorized, since it
is assumed that a favorable act by the government should not make anyone decide to join
Table 4.1: List of PFSA States and Events
States Description Events Description
I State of being undecid-
ed/neutral
g A popular act by the
government
R State of supporting the Rev-
olutionary group
g̃ An unpopular govern-
ment act
G State of supporting the Gov-
ernment
ε An internal decision
A State of political advantage s Success of the revolution
D State of political disadvan-
tage


















Figure 4.2: Schematic of normative perspective encoded as a PFSA
the opposing group. Also, the same event can cause alternate transitions from the same
state; the actual transition will depend probabilistically on the measure of attractiveness of
the possible target states. In the simplied model described, all events of the same type
are clubbed together as g (popular) or g̃ (unpopular acts by the government). However,
varying degrees of `popularity' and `unpopularity' of government acts can be encoded by
creating separate groups g1, g2, ..., gn and g̃1, g̃2, ..., g̃m with dierent costs associated with
these transitions.
4.3.2 Rewards, Transition Costs and Probabilities
The probability of transitioning from one state to another depends on three things - whether
the target state is reachable from the current state, whether the current event acts as an
impetus for state change, and whether the target state is relatively more attractive compared
to the current state. The concept of positive real measure of a sequence of events is used to
calculate the relative degree of attractiveness of states [88]. This is briey explained next.
A nite state machine consists of states, inputs and outputs. The number of states is
xed; when an input is executed, the state is changed and an output is possibly produced.
The probabilistic automaton is a generalization of the nite automaton structure and includes
two probabilities: the probability P of a particular state transition taking place, and with
the initial state q0 replaced by a stochastic vector giving the probability of the automaton
being in a given initial state.
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With suitable denitions of the states, inputs and transition matrices, the PFSA structure
is well-suited for quantifying the IDMA framework. Let the discrete choice behavior be
modelled as a PFSA as:
Gi ≡ (Q,Σ, δ, qi, Qm) (4.1)
where Q = {I, R,G,A,D} is the nite set of choices with |Q| = 5 and the initial state
qi ∈ Q = I; i.e. the whole society is neutral in the initial stage. The distribution of





N ], given by:
vij =
 1 if i = j,0 if i 6= j. (4.2)
Σ = {ε, g, g̃, s, f} is the (nite) alphabet of events (inputs to the PFSA) with |Σ| = 5; the
Kleene closure of Σ is denoted as Σ∗; the (possibly partial) function δ : Q× Σ×Q→ [0, 1]
represents probabilities of state transitions and δ∗ : Q×Σ∗×Q→ [0, 1] is an extension of δ;
and Qm ⊆ Q is the set of marked (i.e. accepted) states. It may be noted that the parameters
of the model introduced so far are a physical manifestation of the choices that each rational
actor faces in an election scenario (as explored in [88]) - the choice set Q is well dened by
the number of available options (parties to vote for, G and R in this case), and the initial
state choice (qi = I) allows the simulation to start from the same point every time. The
eect of initial clustering of similar choices in regional and local neighborhoods can be an
important factor. The transition probability δ signies a parameter that the actors learn or
estimate through their experience and understanding.
Denition. The reward from each state χ : Q → [0,∞) is dened as a characteristic
function that assigns a positive real weight to each state qi, such that
χ(qj) ∈
 [0, ∞) if qj ∈ Qm,{0} if qj /∈ Qm. (4.3)
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Denition. The event cost, conditioned on a PFSA state at which the event is generated,
is dened as π̃ : Σ∗ ×Q→ [0, 1] such that ∀qj ∈ Q, ∀σk ∈ Σ,∀s ∈ Σ∗,
(1) π̃[σk, qj] ≡ π̃jk ∈ [0, 1);
∑
k π̃jk < 1;
(2) π̃[σ, qj] = 0 if δ(qj, σ, qk) = 0∀k; π̃[ε, qj] = 1;
The event cost matrix, (Π̃-matrix), is dened as: Π̃=

π̃11 π̃12 . . . π̃1m
π̃21 π̃22 . . . π̃2n
...
... . . .
...
π̃n1 π̃n2 . . . π̃nm

The characteristic vector χ̄ is a numerical depiction of an individual's perception of
expected benets or rewards to be obtained by being in a particular state. For example,
if the states represent various job choices, the remuneration from these jobs can serve as
the characteristic vector. On the other hand, the event cost is an intrinsic property of the
nominal perspective. The event cost is conceptually similar to the state-based conditional
probability of Markov Chains, except
∑
k π̃jk = 1 is not allowed to be satised. The condition∑
k π̃jk < 1 provides a sucient condition for the existence of the real signed measure as
discussed in [89].
Denition. The state transition function of the PFSA is dened as a function
π : Q× Q→ [0, 1) such that ∀qj, and qk ∈ Q,
(1) π(qj, qk) =
∑
σ∈Σ: δ(qj ,σ,qk)6=0
π̃(σ, qj) ≡ πjk
(2) and πjk = 0 if {σ ∈ Σ : δ(qj, σ) = qk} = ∅.
The state transition matrix, (Π-matrix ), is dened as: Π=

π11 π12 . . . π1n
π21 π22 . . . π2n
...
... . . .
...
πn1 πn2 . . . πnn

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4.3.3 Measure of Attractiveness of the States




θ (1− θ)τ v̄iΠτ χ̄ (4.4)
where θ ∈ (0, 1] is a user-specied parameter and v̄i is dened in Eqn. 4.2.
Remark. Physical Signicance of Real Measure
Assuming that the state probability vector is v̄i corresponding to the current state of the
Markov process (i), at an instant τ time steps in the future, the state probability vector is
given by v̄iΠτ . Consequently, the expected value of the characteristic function is given by
v̄iΠτ χ̄. The measure of state i described by Eqn. 4.4, is the weighted expected value of χ over
all time steps in the future for the Markov process that begins in state i. The weights for
each time step θ (1− θ)τ form a decreasing geometric series (sum equals to 1). The measure
in vector form yields




Remark. The eect of θ
The rate at which the weights decrease with increasing values of τ is controlled by θ.
More importance is put on the states reachable in the near-future if parameter θ assumes
large values (close to 1) because of the fast decay in the weights. The states through time
are more uniformly weighted for small values of θ allowing the system to interact with a
large neighborhood of the connected states.
The probabilistic decisions are made based on ν̄norm. The discounted expected reward of
a state is proportional to the measure of that state. Higher measure of a state corresponds
to a higher discounted expected reward, hence the potential to make a transition to that
state is higher.
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4.4 Elements of Social Computations
The dynamics of the KH Bounded Condence model is very simple: one of the agents is
chosen at random; then, the agent adopts the average opinion of its compatible neighbors [90,
91]. Compatibility between two nodes is determined by the distance between the current
opinions held by the two nodes. The procedure is repeated by selecting another agent
randomly and so on. The type of nal conguration reached by the system depends on the
value of the condence bound d. For a complete graph, consensus is reached for d > dc,
where dc ' 0.2 or 0.5, depending on whether the average degree of the graph diverges or
stays nite when the number of vertices goes to innity.
In this chapter, it is assumed that the interaction is entirely through the characteristic
function χ of the states [92]. This assumption is based on the insight that the anticipated
reward from a state is the most well-discussed and well-broadcast quantity in a social network








where χ̄itneighbors is the mean reward vector of the rst-order neighbors in the network of agent
i at time step t. Following the notion of bounded condence, only those neighbors whose
opinions are within χ(qj)±d,∀j contribute to the opinion update of agent i. Here, µ (or the
convergence parameter) is the weight which determines how much an agent is inuenced by
the other one.
Since many networks in the real-world are conjectured to be scale free including the World
Wide Web, biological networks, and social networks, in this study, a BA extended model
network created by the Pajek software program is used. Table 4.2 presents the parameters of
the network. In addition, one of the experiments is repeated on a complete graph topology
for comparing the results related to dierent networks.
4.4.1 Numerical Simulations
In this chapter, a population of 100 people are initialized and assigned a random number
drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1), representing the time remaining before that
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Table 4.2: List of parameters used for BA scale-free network
Number of vertices 100
Number of initial disconnected nodes 3
Number of added/rewired edges at a time 2
Probability to add new lines 0.3333
Probability to rewire edges 0.33335
person makes a decision. This imposes an ordering on the list of people in the network. As
soon as someone makes a decision, the time to her/his next decision, drawn from U(0, 1), is
assigned and the list is updated. Additionally, external events g and g̃ are also associated
with a random time drawn from U(a, b). Choosing a and b, the external events can be
interspersed more or less densely.
At t0, all 100 individuals are initialized at state I. Initial values of a mean reward vector
χ̄m and the true event probabilities are xed. Individuals receive a noisy estimate of the
true probabilities and the rewards. At the time epoch tk when it is the ith person's turn to
make a decision, s/he updates his personal estimate of the reward vector according to the
inuence equation (Eqn. 4.6). S/he then calculates the degree of attractiveness of the states
based on the normalized measure using Eqn. 4.5. The transition probabilities are calculated
as P (qtk+1 = q
′|qtk = q, σ = σ′) = νnorm(q′)R(q, σ′, q′) where R(q, σ′, q′) = 1 if σ′ : q → q′
exists, otherwise 0. The only dierence in the case of an external event such as g, g̃, s or f
is that everyone simultaneously updates their states rather than asynchronously, as in the
case of internal events. Alg. 1 describes how numerical simulations of this study have been
conducted.
4.4.2 Eect of Inuencing Agents in Decision Making
In this chapter, the inuences are treated as indistinguishable except for the fact that they
never update or change their χ̄ values; moreover, they do not make decisions, and stay in the
same state of mind during the entire simulation. Also, it is typical that the inuences are
serving a certain agenda, in this case, trying to mobilize forces to join the rebellion. But, this
inuence is exerted very passively, by advertising a higher value for χ(R) and lower values
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Algorithm 1: Interactions and decision making
Data: N,µ, d, θ, Inuence size, network
1 Initialization: Randomly order nodes and events;
2 while Not converged do
3 for Node i do
4 Update χ̄it+1 from Eqn. 4.6;
5 Update ν̄inorm from Eqn. 4.5;
6 Update state for Node i;
7 Insert Node i randomly in the ordered list;
8 end
9 if an external event occurs then
10 Update χ̄it+1 ∀i ∈ N ;
11 Update ν̄inorm ∀i ∈ N ;
12 Update state for all nodes;
13 end
14 end
for all other states as:
χI(qj) =
 χm(qj)−∆ if j = 1, 3, 4, 5,χm(qj) + ∆ if j = 2. (4.7)
in which χI(qj) represents the reward associated with state qj for inuence nodes, and χ̄m
is an estimate of the reward values expressed by the whole society on an average. ∆ is a
parameter adjusting the strength of inuences (control input). In a situation where inuences
have to favor other states, the corresponding element in the mean reward vector needs to be
strengthened.
4.5 Results and Discussions
This chapter investigates the simultaneous interplay between two separate subsystems,
namely a logical decision making subsystem, modelled by a PFSA and the interaction and
inuence subsystem, modelled by Bounded Condence. Parameters of each subsystem is
investigated separately. Moreover, each simulations is conducted in two phases. During the
rst phase (decision epoch ≤ 5000) the dynamics of the opinion evolution is studied without
65
introducing the eect of inuences. In the second phase (decision epoch > 5000), a group of
10 inuences is activated.
4.5.1 PFSA Parameters
External Events: in the rst set of experiments, the ratio of occurrences of good and
bad external events, r = P (g) : P (g̃) is varied to observe the eect of long term government
policies on a population. Each simulation was run 30 times and the average of all the runs
are showed in Fig. 4.3.
Eects of external events can be observed in the rst phase (decision epoch≤ 5000) of
each subgure. When r = P (g) : P (g̃) = 1 : 1, the percentage of the population in states
R and G are equal, and a large part of the population remains undecided (Fig. 4.3a). In
the absence of any deadline for making a decision this result is only to be expected. As the
government starts to push more and more unpopular policies, opinions bifurcate and the































(a) r = 1 : 1































(b) r = 3 : 7































(c) r = 1 : 9































(d) r = 7 : 3































(e) r = 9 : 1
Figure 4.3: Eect of external events on the nal state distribution of the society with
|I| = 10 and ∆ = 0.3
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rebellion group starts to become more popular. Distribution of the society between the 3
states varies monotonically with r.
Presence of inuences in the second phase causes a dramatic change in system behavior.
In each of the inuenced cases (Fig. 4.3), the percentage of the population in state R starts
to increase rapidly as soon as the inuencing nodes are activated. Interestingly, the length
of the transition phase between the initial (uninuenced) distribution and the nal steady
state is independent of r (Table 4.3). The nal steady state distribution, on the other hand
is aected both by r, and I. In Fig. 4.3e, the number of popular policies by the government
is high enough to overcome the eect of inuences, and therefore, a smaller portion of people
are converted to join the rebellion state. It may be noted that the quick transition period
is a clear indication of the narrow window of opportunity available to intervene and prevent
the society from transitioning into instability.
Table 4.3: Convergence time related to dierent ratios in Fig. 4.3
r 1 : 9 3 : 7 1 : 1 7 : 3 9 : 1
Convergence Time 6958 6940 6986 6856 6739
Comparison of IDMA with Standard Interaction Models: a focus on network
structure and large scale dynamics rather than individual behavior have successfully put
forward several elegant theories of emergent social behaviors such as evolution of opinions,
consensus formation, properties of elections, and formation of a common language.
In order to gauge the relative expressive power of such a simple interaction dynamics with
the IDMA framework developed in this study, we directly compare the results obtained by
implementing the more complex IDMA framework with that of a well-established but simple
model of social interaction, namely the Voter model where at each step, an arbitrarily chosen
node imitates the state of an arbitrarily chosen neighbor. We use the same parameters
to make the comparison reliable such as the same BA scale free network, and consider a
population of indecisive people alongside a few inuences who promote joining the rebellion
group. In this setup, people can stay in the indecisiveness state, or they can join either the
rebellion group, or the group which supports the government. Again, inuences enter the
simulations after the 5000th decision step, Fig. 4.4.
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(b) r = 3 : 7
Figure 4.4: eects of incorporating an IDMA
One of the shortcomings of the Voter model becomes apparent from the rst phase of
the simulations; since the Voter model runs purely on imitation, starting from an initial
condition where all agents are in the state of indecisiveness, none of them is able to change
their state to another one. Conversely, when IDMA is included in the model, with the help
of the reward vector, eects of external events can be taken into account resulting in opinion
change of agents in this region.
Another drawback of the Voter model can be seen in the second phase of the simulations.
As soon as inuences are activated, the number of people supporting the revolution increases;
and nally converges to one of the stable equilibria where all nodes cluster in the R-state.
This phenomenon is rather unrealistic. However, in the model with IDMA, although this
increase is seen, this is limited by the heterogeneity in the probabilistic decision making
logic of individuals. Most importantly, this model can thus predict and converge to multiple
equilibria, rather than just the three unrealistic pure states where the Voter model converges.
Considering these factors, the benets of incorporating rational decision making in opinion
change models become apparent though it comes with added layers of complexity.
68
4.5.2 BC Model Parameters
Distance Parameter (d) and the Control Input ∆: the inuences deliberately advertise
biased reward values in an attempt to pull the population slowly towards the state of their
choice (R, in this chapter). The amount of bias (∆) is vitally important since too high
of an oset would cause the inuences to drift outside the condence bound of the general
population, and consequently they will not be able to enter into dialogues with the undecided
nodes. On the other hand, a very low ∆ will not have a pronounced eect on the dynamics
of opinion evolution and will not be able to produce a substantial change on a global scale.
Since ∆ may be thought of as an opinion bias adopted by the inuencing group in order
to control the nal distribution of people over the dierent states, we call ∆ the control
input. d is the distance parameter that determines the bound in the Bounded Condence
model. For simplicity, the eect of d and ∆ are presented here only with respect to the state
R,Fig. 4.5. The results for other states are qualitatively equivalent. Higher values of ∆ mean
stronger inuences exist in the society whose reward vectors have been altered signicantly
(Eqn. 4.7). Hence, for low values of d, agents do not interact with inuences causing no
change in the system behavior. However, for low values of ∆, although agents interact with
inuences, the inuences are not strong enough to seriously aect the system behavior.
As an example, for an intermediate condence bound (d = 0.3), agents can interact with
strong inuences resulting in noticeable changes in the behavior. However, if the control
∆ is too high, inuences lie out of the condence zone of agents. So, although present,
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Figure 4.5: Dependence of the dynamics of the R state on d and ∆ with |I| = 10
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inuences cannot aect the society. For d = 0.5, agents are able to interact with even
stronger inuences. Consequently, a higher percentage of the population is in state R. From
a social psychology perspective, it is very important to estimate the bound of condence for
individual groups in order to be eective in bringing about positive change. The optimal
approach when trying to impact an older population may not be similar to the control
parameter suitable for younger demographics.
Convergence Parameter: based on Eqn. 4.6, the convergence parameter determines the
inuenceability of a node, i.e. to what extent a node adheres to his personal estimates of
anticipated rewards from a choice as opposed to converging to the mean estimate gathered
from his rst-order neighbors. µ = 0 implies complete self-reliance while making decisions,
whereas µ = 1 implies complete malleability. It may be conjectured that, larger µs might
lead to fewer steps required for convergence for the population as a whole. This conjecture
is validated in Fig. 4.6.
Convergence parameter (µ)

































Figure 4.6: Eect of µ on convergence time
Clustering Behavior: formation of clusters is a typical behavior observed in the Bounded
Condence (BC) model. The distance parameter d determines the number of clusters in the
equilibrium state of a system. Large values of d results in interactions among a large number
of nodes, and consequently very few clusters emerge [78]. This phenomena is visualized in
Fig. 4.7. As the distance parameter increases, the number of clusters decreases.
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(a) d = 0.1 (b) d = 0.3 (c) d = 0.5
Figure 4.7: Clustering behavior of the BC model for dierent d's with |I| = 10
Addition of inuences after 5000 decision epochs adds a layer of complexity to the
clustering process. The inuences eectively attract and cluster nodes, but in societies with
low condence bounds (d = 0.1), the eect is very local. Most clusters retain their identities
and never enter into any interactions outside their own clique. This is demonstrated in Fig.
4.7a where the small eect of the inuences is illustrated in the inset. Broadly speaking,
this implies that societies which are highly clustered due to low condence bounds are more
dicult to inuence, unless all the nodes are very homogeneous to begin with. An increase
in d allows more agents to interact (with each other as well as with inuences), and therefore
a more populated cluster forms around inuences (d = 0.3). Finally, when d = 0.5, the
inuences are reachable to all agents resulting in only one cluster around inuences.
Varying Control Input ∆(t): so far, the inuences have always been treated as static
agents; i.e. the pro-revolution value of χI(q2) was xed and unchanged during the course of
the simulation. The motivation behind studying varying control input (∆) is to investigate
whether a small group of inuences can start from a popular stand-point, cluster the
population around themselves, aect them continuously without getting out of population's
condence bound, and guide them to a dierent set of rewards (χ̄) which ultimately
get ltered through the IDMA to support of a dierent state. To do so, a new set of
experimentations have been conducted using the exact same model; however, the χ value of
inuences increases linearly as a function of time steps with a rate of r.
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The results of these experiments are shown in Fig. 4.8. Results are presented based on the
distance parameter d and the rate r. The red graph represents the χ value of inuences at
each time step. Fig. 4.8 depicts that for a specic distance parameter, there is a threshold for
r after which the inuences get strong so fast that the society looses its reach to inuences.
For example, in Fig. 4.8a, the increase rate is low resulting in a homogenous population
clustered around inuences. However, as r increases, clusters appear both in and out of
the reach of inuences, Fig. 4.8b. Finally, after the threshold, the whole society looses its
reach to the inuences, Fig. 4.8c, rendering their presence in the society obsolete. The same
reasoning can be applied for Figs. 4.8d, e, f.
It can also be seen that the threshold for r depends on the distance parameter d. When
r = 0.0005, d = 0.3 produces a cluster who do not get aected by the inuences, but d = 0.5
produces a homogenous population grouped around inuences. Or, in the case of r = 0.001,

















































































































(f) d = 0.5, r = 0.005
Figure 4.8: Clustering behavior of a society in the presence of inuences with variable
control input
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in a society with clusters both in and out of the reach of inuences. This phenomenon is in
line with the ndings of the previous section.
The interesting nding of these experiments is the fact that although for some rates the
inuences get out of the reach of individuals very fast, in the time interval when they do
interact with individuals, the whole society is aected by their presence. For example, in
Fig. 4.8b, in the rst few time steps, most of the society start lagging the inuences, but
they cluster again at a higher level of reward values. This means that the society is more
inclined towards the rebellion state (although inuences are out of reach) in comparison to
the period when inuences were absent.
Eect of Network Topology: gure 4.9 provides a comparison of the time evolution of
the BC interactions deployed on a BA network and on a complete graph. Intuitively, the
complete graph promises to have a faster dynamics since the average degree of each node is
higher and inuence should propagate faster. Conversely, results from numerical simulations
indicate the opposite; inuence propagation through the BA network is faster (measured
by a smaller transition period between initial and nal states). This can be qualitatively
explained by the fact that the relative inuence on each node from the inuences is much
lower when the nodes are connected through a complete network. The presence of many
links from other regular nodes dilute the eect of the inuencing nodes leading to a slower
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Figure 4.9: Eect of dierent network types on the nal state distribution with |I| = 10
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change and a lower percentage of the population in state R at equilibrium. The convergence
times for the two networks under discussion are reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Comparison of characteristics related to two dierent Networks
Network Convergence Time Percentage of population in R
BA 6624 51.51
Complete Graph 8156 49.98
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter attempts to incorporate a micro-level decision making paradigm along with
a social interaction model (Bounded Condence) in presence of inuences (zealots). Every
agent in the society is given a decision making ability (to choose from a xed set of states).
The decision making is based on maximization of accumulated rewards gained as a result of
an individual's own choices in presence of dierent events.
The eects of interactions and events on the nal distribution of decision states are studied
with and without the presence of inuences. Bounded condence model parameters (the
distance parameter and the convergence parameter) are used to study the nal distribution of
states and the time the society needs to reach its equilibrium (convergence time). Moreover,
eects of network topology on the nal distribution of states, convergence time, and dynamic
of the society is presented.
It is observed that without inuences, the nal distribution of states is purely a function of
the external events; more unpopular policies by the government result in higher percentages
of people joining the rebellion group. However, presence of inuences causes a rapid change
in the behavior of the system in favor of the group they support (state R). A short transition
period is required for the system to reach equilibrium after the inuences are activated.
It is shown that no change in the nal distribution of states takes place unless inuences
are in the condence bound of the population and at the same time, have large enough
osets. The clustering behavior of the BC model is visualized for dierent values of the
distance parameter. It is concluded that the time interval needed for a system to reach
its equilibrium decreases as the convergence parameter increases. In addition, the eect of
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varying inenceability is studied. Results show that there is a limit for the inuence rate
so that the society can keep up with the inuences, and that limit depends on the distance
parameter.
Finally, simulations reveal that not only is inuence propagation slower in the society
when agents have higher number of links (complete graph network), but also their eect in
the nal distribution of state R is weaker too.
75
Chapter 5
An Experimental Study on the
Controllability of Collective Human
Behaviors in Networked Societies
5.1 Objective
In the preceding chapters, the main focus of this thesis was theoretical development of
concepts related to opinion evolution and eect of inuences in networked societies. To do
so, mathematical models were developed, analytical solutions were derived, and numerical
simulations were provided. However, both the literature and this thesis lack experimental
studies on the eect of inuences on collective behavior of groups. This chapter provides
an experimental setup along with dierent experimental scenarios to study the eect of
inuences on collective human behaviors.
5.2 Background
Eect of inuences (control inputs) on the behavioral dynamics of a group of people has
been one of the focal points of social psychology studies for years - group psychology and
attitude change being studied through small-scale group experiments. From word-of-mouth
marketing studies and mathematical study of virality and meme propagation, it has been
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shown that using inuences is an eective way to change the behavioral dynamics of groups
[64, 95, 96]. This chapter aims to expand on a series of experiments from 2006 performed
by Kearns et al. [97] to gain a better understanding of the eect of inuences on a group in
collaboratively solving a puzzle.
Kearns et al. [97] studied the eect of dierent network structures on the behavioral
dynamics of people by the use of the well-known Graph Coloring Problem. In this game,
every individual (player) is in charge of a node on the network, and the collective goal is for
every player to select a dierent color for their node that is dierent from the colors of all
of their network neighbors [98]. The number of available colors in the experiment is equal
to the Chromatic Number of the network which is the minimum number of colors necessary
to color the entire network without any conicts. The graph is solved when there are no
conicts in the graph (no two nodes with the same colors are attached to each other). In this
work, it is concluded that the higher the complexity of the network, the harder it is for the
participants to solve the graph. The metrics of this study are the frequency of successful
solutions, and the Average Solution Time (AST).
We have modied the graph coloring problem description to make it suitable to
quantitatively study the eect of inuences on this collective behavior. Additionally, the
graph coloring problem mimics the dynamics of the Repulsive Voter Model introduced in
chapter 3 when the chromatic number of the network is 2. We dene inuences as individuals
who collectively select a unique solution to the particular network under consideration,
assume the colors representative of that solution and never change their color during the
experiment. These inuences can be hidden or known. We have chosen only two types of
the networks, from the previous study [97], small world and scale free. These networks are
visualized in Fig. 5.1. The chromatic number of the small world network is 2, whereas the
chromatic number of the scale free network is 3.
5.3 Experimental Setup
This section explains all the details of the experimental setup. In [97], the eect of parameters





















































(b) Scale Free Network
Figure 5.1: Networks used in the experiments
network. Each participant is assigned the control of a node in the network, and they can
interact only through the network. We have created our networked game on UnrealEngine4.
After everyone playing the game logs in, they are randomly connected to each other
based on a pre-designed network representing which nodes are socially connected. As the
participants click through their choices (colors), these choices are recorded for each user's
identier along with a time stamp corresponding to the time when each decision is made.
The full set of information passed to each user in the game's interface is (Fig. 5.2):
1. The progression of the game.
2. The opinion of his/her anonymous network neighbors.
3. The conicts between the participant and his/her neighbors.
4. The remaining time.
In our experiments, participants are university undergraduate and graduate students. In
each experiment, depending on the scenario under study, there are approximately 30 students
from a selection of dierent disciplines. Each experiment is programmed to stop when the
graph is solved or otherwise at 5 minutes, and each scenario is conducted 6 times. Students
have the option to not participate and are provided with an informed consent document.
Figure 5.2 represents the physical setup of the experiments.
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(a) User Interface (b) Physical Setup
Figure 5.2: Physical setup of the experiments and game's user interface
5.4 Experiment Scenarios and Results
In this section, dierent experiment scenarios and their results will be presented. The order
of experiments and results does not necessarily follow the order of the actual experiments.
5.4.1 Scenario 1. Benchmark (BM)
In this scenario there are no inuences present, and it is designed as a benchmark and a
basis for comparison. We witness a lot of similarity between the results of our experiments
and those of [97]; In our experiments, too, it is harder to solve the network with higher
complexity (scale free). In our experiments, the small world network is solved 5 times, and
the scale free networke is solved once. In [97], the small world network was solved 6 times,
and the scale free networked was solved 2 times. The slight dierence in the results of our
experiments and those of [97] follow from the fact that the network sizes and consequently
their structures are not exactly the same in these two studies.
Futhermore, our analysis shows that in most of the unsuccessful experiments, 98% of the
graph is solved, and the only conicting nodes are the nodes with high number of connections.
If one of the nodes changes its color to resolve only one conict, then up to 12 conicts might
apprear within their neighborhood.
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5.4.2 Scenario 2. Three hidden inuences on nodes with highest
degrees (3HIHD)
As mentioned earlier, inuences are dened as as individuals who collectively select a unique
solution to the particular network under consideration, assume the colors representative of
that solution and never change their color during the experiment. A hidden inuence is
dened as a node whose neighbors do not know that their color is xed. In this scenario
we chose 3 of the nodes of each network with the highest number of connections to be the




















































(b) Scale Free Network
Figure 5.3: Location of three hidden inuences
The results of the experiment show clear changes in the behavioral dynamics of
participants. The small world network is solved 6 times and with a shorter AST. Also,
the scale free networked is solved 5 times with a much shorter AST, Fig. 5.4. This drastic
change in the dynamics is in part because three nodes do not change colors during the
experiments, so there are 27 nodes left to color, and in part because the problematic nodes
from the benchmark experiments are already solved by the inuences.
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(b) Average Solution Time
Figure 5.4: Eect of hidden inuences (3HIHD) on the dynamic compared to the
benchmark (BM)
5.4.3 Scenario 3. Three known inuences on nodes with highest
degrees (3KIHD)
In [97], researchers studied the eect of providing extra information to the participants on
the collective behavior of the group by giving them the global view of the experiment. In our
experiments, we provide extra information to the participants by informing them whether
they are attached to inuences; the inuences were in the shape of a triangle. We also
inform the participants that the inuences do not change colors by writing Fixed inside
the triangles; we also instruct the participants to expect their neighbors to not change colors
when they see that their neighbor is a triangle with the word Fixed on them. Figure 5.5
illustrates the presentation of known inuences to the participants (if connected) in the user
interface. We have chosen the same nodes from 3HIHD to be inuences.
The results illustrate that in presence of known inuences the success rate is 100%, and
the AST is even shorter than those of the hidden inuences in both networks, Fig. 5.6. This
is because of the fact that most people are connected to inuences; when an agent knows
one of it's neighbors will never change colors, the size of the decision space for them reduces
to 1 dimension in the small world network, and to 2 or 1 in the scale free network. This
makes it easier for the participents to make decisions and choose colors.
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Figure 5.5: User interface when the participant is connected to a known inuence














































(b) Average Solution Time
Figure 5.6: Eect of Known inuences (3KIHD) compared to the eect of hidden inuences
(3HIHD) and the benchmark (BM)
82
5.4.4 Scenario 4. One hidden inuence on the node with the highest
degree (1HIHD)
The results from previous experiments indicate that having three inuences does aect the
dynamics of the collective behavior. In this scenario, we want to investigate the eect of
number of inuences on the dynamics. We use only one inuence on the node with the
highest number of connections.
Results of the experiments depict that for the small world network, the success frequency
is 6/6 which is better than that of the benchmark, and the AST is also shorter than AST of
the benchmark. However, when comparing these results to the scenario with three hidden
inuences, it is observed that AST increases, Fig. 5.7.
Conversely, in the scale-free network, acquired data reveals that one hidden inuence is
not capable of changing the dynamics compared to the benchmark neither in the frequency
of success, nor in shortening the AST, Fig. 5.7. This phenomenon happens because the
chromatic number of the scale free network is 3, and adding only one inuence does not
reduce the size of the solution space to 1. As a results, there is no dierence between a
system with one inuence and a system without inuences. In this case, it would have been
better to have two inuences to limit the size of the solution space to 1.













































(b) Average Solution Time
Figure 5.7: Eect of one hidden inuence (1HIHD) compared to the Eect of three hidden
inuences (3HIHD) and the benchmark (BM)
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5.4.5 Scenario 5. One known inuence on the node with the highest
degree (1KIHD)
In this scenario, we repeat the experiment from 1HIHD with a known inuence. In the
scale free network, the performance gets slightly better than the hidden scenario both in
frequency of success, and AST. However, in the small world network, only ve experiments
are successful, and the AST is longer. This nding is in contrast with the previous ndings
that known inuences have better performance than the hidden types. We believe the
only unsuccessful experiment could be because of human errors during the game. If the
unsuccessful experiment is removed from the analyses, then the AST is much shorter than
that from 1HIHD, Fig. 5.8.














































(b) Average Solution Time
Figure 5.8: Eect of one known inuence (1KIHD) compared to the Eect of one hidden
inuence (1HIHD) and the benchmark (BM)
5.4.6 Scenario 6. Three known inuences on the nodes with the
lowest degrees (3KILD)
So far, to expose most of the nodes in both networks to inuences, we have been choosing
the nodes with the highest degrees to be inuences. In this scenario, we want to study the
eect of inuence placement on the dynamics on the collective behavior. We choose three of
the nodes with the lowest connections to be the inuences. We also argue that since six or
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seven nodes will be exposed to inuences, it would be better to have only known inuences.





















































Figure 5.9: Location of the three known inuences on the nodes with the lowes degrees
Results of the experiments illustrate that even though placed on the nodes with the
lowest degrees, having inuences in the network changes the dynamics in both networks in
comparison to the benchmark; the success frequencies are higher and the AST is shorter.
However, this type of inuence placement is not as eective as placing inuences on the
nodes with the highest degrees, Fig. 5.10.














































(b) Average Solution Time






















































Figure 5.11: Location of the inuence on the node with lowest degree but connected to
nodes with high degrees
5.4.7 Scenario 7. One known inuence on the node with the lowest
degree adjacent to high degree nodes (1KILD)
We already learned that location of the inuences is very important in the dynamics of the
system. In this scenario, the purpose is to study whether choosing the node with the highest
degree is the best option to maximize inuence. We will repeat the experiment 1KIHD with
a dierent placement in both networks. In the scale free network, we have chosen a node
with two connections which is connected to nodes with high degrees. In the small world
network, again, we have chosen a node with two neighbors one of whom had the highest
number of connections and the other one did not, Fig. 5.11.
Results of the experiments depict that in the scale-free network this placement enhances
both frequency of success and AST compared to 1KIHD scenario. Conversely, a negative
eect on the collective behavior is observed in the small world network, Fig. 5.12. This proves
that having high number of connections does not necessarily result in the optimized inuence
on the collective behavior; i.e. rst degree exposure to inuences is not the determining factor
in inuence maximization.
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(b) Average Solution Time
Figure 5.12: Eect of placement of inuences on low degree nodes adjacent to high degree
nodes
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, eects of inuences on the collective behavior of a group of connected
individuals has been experimentally studied. To do so, we have extended on a series of
experiments by Kearns et al. [97] by adding the concept of inuences. We have presented
the details of the experiment setup, and then we have explained how the experiments are
conducted. We have designed dierent scenarios to investigate dierent phenomena such
as eect of adding hidden inuences, eect of adding known inuences, eect of number of
inuences, and eect of placement of inuences.
We found out that having inuences does enhance the performance of participants, and
between hidden and known inuences, the known inuences performed even better. We
also showed that placement of inuences is of great importance to optimize the performance
control. Additionally, we proved that having high number of rst degree neighbors for a






The overarching goal of this thesis is to further our understanding about opinion evolution
in networked societies. Such insights can be used in a variety of elds such as economy,
marketing, transportation, egress, etc. Three main subjects build up this interdisciplinary
research: Sociology, Statistical Mechanics, and Network Sciences. In this thesis, rstly,
techniques from statistical mechanics have been borrowed to mathematically model opinion
dynamics on dierent network topologies based on dierent interaction models (macro-level
or society-level analyses). Controllability of such dynamics have been investigated both
mathematically and with simulations. Secondly, to incorporate individual-level parameters in
opinion dynamics of a group of people, Individual Decision Making Algorithms (IDMA) have
been designed. Finally, extensive experimentation in presence of actual humans have been
performed to study the conrollability of collective human behaviors in a group of connected
individuals. The common theme among the above-mentioned goals is to understand




Objective 1 (addressing Gap 1 ). Mathematical modeling of opinion evolution (DE-
Models). In this section of the thesis, mathematical modeling of various combinations of
interaction models and network topologies will be performed in the framework of the Master
Equation (ME). ME is a stochastic differential equation describing how the population is
distributed over the opinion space and how such distribution changes with time. All the
analyses will be performed, which accounts for the presence of inuences (control inputs) in
the society. Analytical solutions are expected to cast light on different aspects of the system
such as convergence time, equilibrium state opinion distribution, progression of the opinion
dynamics, controllability of the system, etc.
 Mathematically modelled the Inuenced Sznajd model on a Complete Graph and
assessed the controllability of the dynamics (Chapter 2)
 Introduced a new interaction model called The Repulsive Voter Model, modelled it
with/without inuences on dierent network topologies e.g. Complete Graph, Random
Graph, and a lattice; assessed the controllability of the derived dynamics (Chapter 3)
Objective 2 (addressing Gap 1 ). Numerical simulations of the systems from
Objective 1. This section will be devoted to extensive Monte Carlo simulations of the
indicated systems in Objective 1. These simulations will be used to validate the precision of
modeling procedures and accuracy of analytical solutions. Also, these simulations will serve
as a guide towards appropriate time scaling procedures of the systems. Effects of control
inputs on the nal state of the society can be investigated with such simulations.
 Developed a Monte-Carlo simulation in presence of inuences and studied the
controllability of the inuenced Sznajd model, proved the existance of convergence
zones, proved the linear scalibility property of the system, and performed entropy
analyses (Chapter 2)
 Developed a Monte-Carlo simulation in presence of inuences and studied the
controllability of the repulsive voter model, studied the equilibrium density and
expected magnetization of the system (Chapter 3)
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Objective 3 (addressing Gap 2 ). Decision making (AB-Models). This section of
the thesis will concentrate on the decision making processes of individuals (designed in the
framework of a Probabilistic Finite State Automata (PFSA)). The decision making algorithm
will be able to model the behavior of agents when they are exposed to external events, and
also when they interact with other people. This part of the study combines micro-level
and macro-level parameters of opinion evolution. Such combination can be instrumental in
understanding the mutual effects that the society and the individual have on each other; or,
how inuences can alter an individual's decisions and cognitive states.
 Developed an Individual Decision Making Algorithm in the frame of the Probabilistic
Finite State Automata and incorporated the eect of interactions in it (Chapter ??)
 Developed a Monte-Carlo simulation in presence of inuences and studied the
controllability of the groups collective decision making patterns (Chapter ??)
 Performed a thorough parametric study and provided the results and discussions
(Chapter ??)
Objective 4 (addressing Gap 3 ). Assessing controllability of collective human
behaviors in presence of actual humans. This part of the thesis will be devoted to
studying the controllability of collective behavior of people in an experimental setup in
presence of actual humans. Different inuence scenarios will be developed with the purpose
of maximizing the inuence of control inputs. Optimality, and time-effectiveness of these
algorithms are the important design parameters.
 Developed a multi-player game on UnrealEngine4 and tested it (Chapter 5)
 Designed dierent experiment scenarios to investigate the eect of presence of
inuences in a system, number of inuences in the system, and the placement of
inuences in the network (Chapter 5)
 Conducted the experiments in two dierent sessions (Summer and Fall of 2018) and
acquired data (Chapter 5)
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 Performed extensive analyses on the collected data and provided results and compre-
hensive discussions (Chapter 5)
6.2 Future Directions
The research line of this thesis can be continued in dierent directions. Expanding on the
mathematical modeling of dierent interaction models is one of the avenues to take on.
Inuenced bounded condence is a clear example. Or, new models need to be developed
to capture the eect of agents' movements (Chapters 2 and 3). The individual decision
making aspect of this research could be followed by incorporating real world data into the
development of algorithms, or by further involving psychological concepts in the simulations
(Chapter 4). The experimental study presented in this thesis has the potential to be
used for numerous studies regarding collective behaviors. Behavioral anomaly detection,
behavioral classication, study of gate keepers, autonomous vehicle platoon formation,
building evacuation, roadway crossings, etc. are a few of the avenues for which researchers
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A Parametric Study of Opinion
Progression in a Divided Society
In chapter 4, it was assumed that all the agents shared the same normative perspective, and
the agents did not have specic biases. However, in reality, people carry preconceptions and
biases. These preconceptions play a prominent role in their decision making. This chapter
is an eort to address this problem. In this chapter, we simulate a society which includes
three groups with dierent pre-biases.
A.1 Introduction
While the extremity of the current (2017) political rhetoric may feel unprecedented,
confrontation has always focused on the singular goal of winning over the other side. As an
entire population becomes consumed by this mindset, we reenact partisan patterns of conict
that may comfort our fears, promote strong clustering between like-minded people, but
undermine cooperation across society and the chance of ever achieving unity and consensus.
Studies suggest that the operation of homophily, i.e. the tendency to follow like-minded
individuals and to shun those with opposing opinions, is strongly prevalent in social media
applications [99]. Furthermore, shared geo-locality and communal bonds are strengthened
via Twitter posts, permitting forms of peripheral awareness and ambient community" [100].
To model these ndings, several non-linear interaction models among individuals, have been
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studied which illustrate polarized decision, the self-organization of behavioral conventions,
and the transition from individual to mass behavior. In one such study by Shutters [101],
the cultural polarization phenomenon has been studied on dierent network structures in
the presence of extremists in the framework of bounded condence. In this study, the change
of opinion after each interaction is guaranteed for non-extremists, rendering the imitation
and simulation of human decision making rather unrealistic.
This chapter is an attempt to construct a parametric study that can address at least
a portion of these ideas within a mathematically tractable agent-based modeling (ABM)
framework. The Probabilistic Finite State Automata (PFSA) based discrete choice model,
proposed and studied in [88] has been modied with one key dierence. The scenario under
discussion and its key dierence are explained in the next section. Also, the PFSA framework
and its assumptions are briey explained. Next, we discuss how the Bounded Condence
interaction model is applied in the simualtions. Then the results of simulations for dierent
scenarios are presented and discussed. In the end, all ndings of this chapter are summarized
and concluded.
A.2 Simulation Setup
A.2.1 Probabilistic Finite state Automata
This framework has already been explained in chapter 4. However, because another problem
is addressed in this chapter, some changes have been made to the assumptions. In this
framework, it is assumed that every agent has the same nite set of discrete choices (or states)
at each time instant. Also, we assume that agents subscribe to the normative perspective
of the group they belong to; social norms of groups can dier from each other, but inside a
group the same social norm is shared with everybody.
Assumption. Dierent normative perspective for dierent groups
In this chapter, it is assumed that the society is divided in three groups: the Independent
group, the group with preexisting bias towards Revolution (R-Leaning), and the group biased
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towards the government (G-Leaning). The way each group perceives the actions of the
government is dierent. Members of the Independent group perceive the popular actions as
good and the unpopular actions as bad. However, members of the R-Leaning group perceive
all actions of the government as bad. On the other hand, members of the G-Leaning group
perceive all actions of the government as good. This assumption results in having three
dierent normative perspectives in the population, Fig. A.1.
Figure A.1a gives a schematic of the assumed normative perspective encoded as a PFSA
for the Independent group . It may be noticed that transitions such as g : G → R or
g : I → R are unauthorized since it is assumed that a favorable act by the government
should not make anyone decide to join the opposing group. Also, the same event can cause
alternate transitions from the same state; the actual transition will depend probabilistically
on the measure of attractiveness of the possible target states. In Fig. A.1b, all actions of
the government are clubbed together and recognized as good for the G-Leaning group. The
elimination of some transitions between states in Figs. A.1b, c is rooted in the biased views
that the G-Leaning and R-Leaning groups have. For example, the only way the transition
G → R can be authorized is when an unpopular action by the government, g̃, happens.
Since unpopular actions are perceived as good by the G-Leaning group, G → R can never
happen for this group and must be eliminated.
In the PFSA framework, the probability of transitioning to a dierent state is dependent
on the reachability of that state from the current state, the current event (external or
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(c) R-Leaning
Figure A.1: Normative perspective of dierent groups
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attractiveness measure is calculated using the concept of positive real measure attributed to
a string of events [102]. It depends on the reward from each state (χ), the state transition




θ (1− θ)τ v̄iΠτ χ̄ (A.1)
where θ ∈ (0, 1] is a user-specied parameter. Mathematical structure of the mentioned
parameters are available in chapter 4.
It should be noted at this point that the premise for these assumptions are the authors'
hypotheses and conjectures based on observations from the political sphere, but these are
as of now unsubstantiated by studies or data analytics. The basic observation is that in
response to the SAME political event two groups of people respond in diametrically opposite
manners (strongly in favor, or strongly against) - each group with the same passion and
conviction that they are correct. Thus, although within their own logical construct, the two
groups are not dissimilar, but the perturbation that drives the two groups manifest itself in
two completely dierent ways; to the G-leaning group, each action by the government seems
perfect, while to the R-leaning group, the same actions are detestable.
The other interesting dynamic in these composite groups is the possibility of gradual
drift of opinion due to interaction and inter/intra-group communications. It seems that the
KH bounded condence model of interactions is appropriate since this model predicates that
two nodes only communicate if they are not too dissimilar. A BA-extended model network
created by the Pajek software program is used [103]. Table A.1 presents the parameters of
the network. In addition, one of the experiments is repeated on a complete graph topology
for comparing the results related to dierent networks.
Table A.1: List of parameters used for BA scale-free network
Network Parameter Quantity
Number of vertices 100
Number of initial disconnected nodes 3
Number of added/rewired edges at a time 2
Probability to add new lines 0.3333
Probability to rewire edges 0.33335
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Inuence Model: the inuences are treated as indistinguishable except for the fact that
they never update or change their χ̄ values; moreover, they do not make decisions, and stay
in the same state of mind during the entire simulation. Also, it is typical that the inuences
are serving a certain agenda, in this case, trying to mobilize forces to join the Revolution.
But, this inuence is exerted very passively, by advertising a higher value for χ(R) and lower
value for all other states.
χI(qj) =
 χm(qj)−∆ if j = 1, 3, 4, 5,χm(qj) + ∆ if j = 2. (A.2)
in which χI(qj) represents the reward associated with state qj for inuence nodes, and χ̄m
is an estimate of the reward values expressed by the whole society on an average. ∆ is a
parameter adjusting the strength of inuences (control input).
Simulation Process: a population of 100 people are divided in three groups with specic
ratios (Gi, Ri, Ii where Gi +Ri + Ii = 1). Each group is initialized and given the respective
normative perspective. All agents are assigned a random number drawn from a uniform
distribution U(0, 1), representing the time remaining before that person makes a decision.
This imposes an ordering on the list of people in the network. As soon as someone makes a
decision, the time to his next decision, drawn from U(0, 1), is assigned and the list is updated.
Additionally, external events g and g̃ are also associated with a random time drawn from
U(a, b).
At the time epoch tk, when it is the ith person's turn to make a decision, he updates his
personal estimate of the reward vector according to the Bounded Condence model. Then,
he calculates the degree of attractiveness of the states based on the normalized measure,
using Eqn. A.1. The only dierence in the case of an external event such as g, g̃, s or f
is that everyone simultaneously updates their states rather than asynchronously, as in the
case of internal events. Each simulation is run 50 times and the average of all the runs is
analyzed.
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A.3 Simulation Scenarios and Results
A.3.1 Eect of Global Events
This experiment studies the eect of the ratio of good to bad external events, or equivalently
r = P (g)
P (g̃)
, on the opinion dynamic of the population. First, we consider equal initial
distributions for G-Leaning and R-Leaning groups (Gi = Ri = 0.25). The rst row of
Fig. A.2 provides the results of this type of initial distribution. In all three cases, as soon as
events happen, members of the Independent group change their opinions.
In Fig. A.2a, the same probability of good and bad external events causes the Independent
group to equally divide between the G-Leaning and R-Leaning groups. However, in Fig. A.2b,
because of the higher probability of bad events, people from the Independent group lean
towards the Revolution group. The exact same reasoning can be used for Fig. A.2c
where good actions by the government outnumber the bad ones causing people from the
Independent group to support the Government. It can be concluded that in the absence of
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(f) r = 3 : 7
Figure A.2: Eect of external events on population opinion without inuence group
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inuences, for equal initial distribution, r is the determining factor of the state distribution
of the population at equilibrium.
In a second set of experiments, we consider unequal initial distributions for G-Leaning
and R-Leaning groups (Gi = 0.45, Ri = 0.25). Similar to the previous experiment, when
equal number of good and bad events happen, the Independent group leans towards either
groups somewhat equally, Fig. A.2d.
In Fig. A.2e, when bad events slightly outnumber the good events, the Revolution state
starts to increase, but it is not the dominant opinion of the population as it was in Fig. A.2b.
The reason is that a high percentage of the population is initially in the G-Leaning group. As
a result, Independent members have a higher chance of interacting with G-Leaning members
in their network, and consequently, changing their opinions to G. Nonetheless, when bad
policies outnumber the good policies signicantly, the Revolution state rises to the top and
becomes the dominant opinion of the population, Fig. A.2f. The slight increase in the G state
in the beginning of the simulation is because of this phenomenon. In conclusion, in absence
of inuences, for unequal initial distribution both initial distribution and r are important in
the steady state opinion distribution of the population.
A.3.2 Eect of Inuences
This experiment investigates the eects of presence of inuences and their quantity on
the steady state behavior of the population. In order to specically observe the eect
of inuences, they are activated at decision step 10000, and they are biased towards the
Revolution state. The inuences randomly choose people to form links with where the
probability of forming a link is 0.25. Figure A.3 presents the results of this experiment for
Gi = Ri = 0.3.
In the rst experiment, only one inuence is available in the society, Figs. A.3a, b, c.
When r = 1 : 1, as discussed earlier, Independent members start joining the R or G state
equally, Fig. A.3a. However, as soon as the inuence is activated, the percentage of people
in the R state starts rising drastically because of the interactions which happen among the
population. The interesting point is that there is a slight increase in the state of Indecision
too. The reason can be found in the normative perspective of the G-Leaning group, Fig. A.1b.
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(a) |I| = 1; r = 1 : 1































(b) |I| = 1; r = 7 : 3































(c) |I| = 1; r = 9 : 1
































(d) |I| = 5; r = 1 : 1
































(e) |I| = 5; r = 7 : 3
































(f) |I| = 5; r = 9 : 1
Figure A.3: Eect of external events on population opinion in presence of inuences
As a result of continuous interactions with inuences, even a G-Leaning member might
change her/his opinion to R, and the only path s/he can change her/his opinion from the G
state is through state I. This causes a slight increase in the number of agents in the state
of Indecision.
As the number of popular acts by the government increases, in the rst phase of the
simulation, the Independent members join the G state making it the dominant opinion of
the whole population, Fig. A.3b. However, the presence of the inuence aects people's
opinions through interactions causing the R state to be the dominant opinion of the society
although there are more popular acts by the government. In this scenario, higher probability
of the good actions just makes the transition to the R state slower. The same reasoning is
applicable for Fig. A.3c with the only exception that presence of one inuence is not able to
overcome the eect of signicantly higher probability of the popular acts, to destabilize the
society.
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In another set of experiments, higher number of inuences were added to the population,
Figs. A.3d, e, f. It is observed that with more inuences present, the transition is faster,
and almost all the populations joins the R state. Also, higher number of popular act by
the government cannot prevent the destabilization of the society. This raises the question
that "Can high number of Inuences guide the population towards destabilization under any
condition?"
To answer this question, we consider an extreme case where the initial distribution
is highly in favor of the G-Leaning group (Gi = 0.45, Ri = 0.1), and the probability of
popular actions by the government is signicantly higher. Figure A.4 represents the results
of simulation for such a case with varying number of inuences. As number of inuences
increases, the percentage of population in the R state increases. Moreover, this transition
is faster. However, the inuences are not able to dominate the majority opinion. Both
the dominant initial G-Leaning distribution and the high number of popular acts by the
government cause this behavior. So, a large group of inuences is not a guarantee for
guiding a population towards a predetermined state under all conditions.
































(a) |I| = 5
































(b) |I| = 10
































(c) |I| = 50
Figure A.4: Eect of number of inuences on a G-dominant society with r = 9 : 1
A.3.3 Eect of Distance Parameter (d)
Inuences deliberately advertise biased reward values in an attempt to pull the population
slowly towards the state of their choice (R, in this study). Nonetheless, they would be
successful in doing so if they are reachable for agents in the society. The parameter which
controls reachability is the distance parameter d. In this section, we study the eect of
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the distance parameter on the steady state behavior of the population. Figure A.5 presents
the behavior of a society with two values of d. In Fig. A.5a, because of the low distance
parameter, most of the agents are not able to interact with inuences. As a result the change
in the population behavior is not signicant. However, in Fig. A.5b, the distance parameter
is higher, more agents are aected by the inuences as a result of interacting with them, and
the change in the behavior of the society is signicant.































(a) d = 0.5
































(b) d = 1
Figure A.5: Eect of distance parameter, |I| = 5, r = 1 : 1
A.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter studies the temporal evolution of opinions of individuals in an ideologically
divided society by incorporation a PFSA framework along with the KH Bounded Condence
model. Three ideological groups called Independent, G-Leaning and R-Leaning, form a
population in which people are connected. Indistinguishable inuences are also present
in some experiments. There are two motives for individuals to change their decisions:
popular/unpopular acts by the government, and interactions between people.
Results show that, in absence of inuences, ratio is the determining parameter in the
equilibrium state of the population unless one of the groups includes a signicantly higher
number of members. The results also reveal that although very small in number, inuences
are capable of creating drastic changes in the opinion dynamic of the society. Higher number
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of inuences result in faster transitions and attracting more people to the target state. It is
shown that in the presence of a major group, there are situations where inuences, although
very high in number, are not able to push the population's opinion towards the opinion of
the minor group. Finally, it is presented that with a low distance parameter, the societies
behavior is not greatly aected by the inuences.
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Appendix B
Detecting Behavioral Anomaly in Social
Networks Using Symbolic Dynamic
Filtering
B.1 Introduction
Humans have always existed in social groups and hence have likely always been attuned to the
preferences and positions of others. At the same time, we have evolved sophisticated sensory
systems and brains capable of reaching independent conclusions about the world. Therefore,
in our eorts to function eectively, we have likely had to balance our own experiences, ideas,
and beliefs with those of close and powerful others. This fulcrum between maintaining one's
idiosyncratically-derived views and acquiescing to consensus has been the focus of several
social inuence researches in psychology.
As insightful as this largely individual- and laboratory-based approach has been, it was
not designed to explain social inuence at a broader, mass-scale and has rarely been employed
to explain social inuence at the societal level. At the same time, undeniable and radical
change in the availability of consensus information is likely to have aected that fulcrum
of inuence between the self and others. The rapid dissemination of consensus information
via social media has placed such information literally at the ngertips of billions. Although
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speculative, it has been proposed that the accessibility of such information has facilitated
social movements and rapid mass opinion change, including, perhaps, the recent Arab Spring
that spanned several nations and continents simultaneously, and the rapid rise of ISIS in Syria
and Northern Iraq.
Such events demonstrate a crucial need for better tools to understand the underlying
decision mechanisms that mobilize sudden transitions from indierence to passive crowd
support of fringe social movements to active political violence. These cultural, political
and social snowballing eects are called information cascades [104]. The impact of these
information cascades are felt in many aspects of the social experience, from emergence of
viral videos to large untraceable uctuations in the stock market. From a process-control
perspective, social networks have changed the time scale of the cascading eect.
The concept of information cascades, based on observational learning theory was formally
introduced in a 1992 article by Bikhchandani S. et.al. [104]. Watts D.J. [105] has studied
the origin of rare cascades in terms of a sparse, random network of interacting agents using
generating functions. Statistical mechanics tools, such as the Ising model [106] as well as
non-equilibrium statistical models [107] has been used extensively to model the spread of
inuence in a networked society. Inuence maximization, deals with nding the optimal set
of people in a society to start an information cascade. Approximate solutions to this problem
have been studied by Kempe [108] using submodular functions. However, in all these models,
individual decision logic is largely overlooked.
In a previous work, using an Agent-Based model, the authors have shown [88] that a
handful of inuences (extremists) can cause rapid destabilization. At the same time, the
eectiveness of this radical group can be enhanced by repeated imposition of unpopular
policies by the existing government. This has also been borne out by analytical modeling [8,
26] and real world studies implying that being able to estimate the quantity and mechanism
of inuence in a society has become vital to our well being and security. In this chapter,
we try to estimate the size of the extremist population in a society by monitoring global
responses to relevant external impetus. We are using a stochastic signal processing tool
called Symbolic Dynamic Filtering (SDF) for generating and clustering behavioral patterns
in networks corresponding to dierent levels of inuence. Further, we use neural networks
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to classify and distinguish patterns that characterize two distinct behaviors; one inuenced
by extremist nodes, and the other which is a cumulative response to continued government
unpopularity.
The organization and ow of the research described in this chapter is best described by
the gure shown in Fig. B.1, [109]. In Block 1, we generate data from an agent-based discrete
choice model which relies on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework for stochastic
simulation of decision-making in a social setting where choices and decisions by individuals
are inuenced by social interactions. We show that such collective imitative behavior, based
on local interaction between nodes, (described in Block 2) leads to rapid unstable uctuations
in the society, the uctuation statistics being a weak function of the number of extremist
nodes (inuences/bigots in our example) present in the network as well as the ratio of
popular vs. unpopular policies enacted by the government. The global response is then
passed through SDF (Block 3) which captures the essential characteristics of the data in
the form of statistical patterns. We investigate the eectiveness of SDF in estimating the
number of inuences in the network using a time-trace of opinions in the society. Also, we
use a trained neural net to classify the patterns corresponding to the two types of responses
described above. A short description of each of these blocks are included next.
Figure B.1: Organization of the data ow and enumeration of the aerent blocks used in
this chapter
118
B.2 Block 1: The MDP Framework
The assumption of normative perspective allows rational behavior to be encoded as an
MDP. The Markov Decision Process is conceived as an abstract mathematical construct
that consists of a nite number of states (a set of cognitive states S relevant to the decision
problem). For example, in a society in the cusp of seeing a revolution, for an individual, the
set S may denote the discrete states of supporting either the government, the revolution, or
remaining neutral. The probabilistic automaton generalizes the concept of a Markov chain.
In this chapter, we have modelled the discrete choice behavior as a discrete-time MDP:
Gi = (S,A, T, χ, γ) where S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} is dened as before, A = {a1, a2, ..., am} is a
(nite) set of actions, and the (possibly partial) function T : S × A × S → [0, 1] represents
probabilities of transitions from one state to another; also χ : A × S → χ is the reward or
payo that a person expects to receive from each state. The payo assigns a real weight
to each state si, chosen based on the individual state's impact and the event occurrence
probabilities. When serving as a simplistic Markov decision model for human cognition,
the probability of choosing a particular action from the current state according to a policy
π : S → A is dependent on:
- whether that action is available from the current state (for example, the action of
attending a political rally organized by the government is available to the individuals
who are already in a pro-government state),
- external trigger events (for example, news of atrocities by the government troops may
trigger an instantaneous change in some people), and
- the estimated payo from choosing that action, the expected discounted payo from
possible future actions, and the estimated external political, economic and strategic
event occurrence probabilities. Depending on the context, the payo may be nancial,
personal security, social approval, etc.
The value of a state V π(s, χ) is the weighted expected reward over all time-steps in the
future for the Markov process that begins in state s and adopts policy π. V π(s, χ) is dened
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as:
V π(s, χ) = χ(s) + γΣs′T (s, π(s), s
′)V π(s′, χ). (B.1)
The parameter γ controls the rate at which the weights decrease with time. Large values
of γ force the weights to decay rapidly, thereby placing more importance to states reachable
in the near future from the current state. Thus, γ is the parameter which describes the
balance between long-term and short-term objectives.
In our example, each individual in th society is either in a state of supporting the existing
government, the revolutionary group, or in a state of neutrality. Additionally, the individual
can reach a state of political advantage or disadvantage, but the uncontrollable transition to
these two states can only occur through an external event, namely, the success or failure of
the revolution. The ve MDP states and events are described in Table B.1.
Figure B.2 gives a schematic of the assumed normative perspective encoded as a triggered
MDP. It may be noticed that transitions such as g : G→ R or g : I → R are unauthorized,
since it is assumed that a favorable act by the government should not make anyone decide
to join the opposing group. Also, the same event can cause alternate transitions from the
same state; the actual transition will depend probabilistically on the value of the possible
target states.
B.3 Block 2: Interaction and Social Feedback Algorithms
One of the most interesting facets of a networked society is the strong interdependence
between rewards and popularity of choices. For example, the reward from joining the
Table B.1: List of MDP States and Events
States Description Events Description
I State of indecision g A popular act by the government
R State of supporting the revolution g̃ An unpopular government act
G State of supporting the government ε An internal decision
A State of political advantage s Success of the revolution
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Figure B.2: Schematic of normative perspective coded as a PFSA
revolutionary group (χ(R)) may be small at the initial stages, but as more and more people
join, the estimate of χ(R) as well as the probability of success of the revolution P (s) increases.
Thus, in our modied MDP, the reward χ(s) of a node is a function of the reward values for
adjoining nodes.
In this chapter, it is thus assumed that the inuence is entirely through the reward χ(s)
of the states. This assumption is based on the physical insight that the anticipated reward
from a state is the most well-discussed and well-broadcast quantity in a social network. In
addition, inuence of mass media can be accounted for by assuming that an unbiased reporter
reports the mass opinion in the form of a unied reward for the dierent choices averaged
over the entire population. The interaction dynamics may be mathematically expressed as:












where N is the size of the network, Ni is the set of rst order neighbors of node i, fi is
that fraction of the ith individual's opinion about potential value of the available states that
is based on his past beliefs, gi is the fraction derived from the opinion of his acquaintances
(network neighbors), and hi=1-fi-gi is the fraction formed due to the inuence of mass media
such as newspapers, television, etc.
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B.4 Simulation Results and Symbolic Dynamic Filtering
For simulations, the scale free BA extended model network created with the Pajek [110]
software, Fig. B.3 has been used to model the connectivity structure since many of the real-
world networks are conjectured to be scale free, including the World Wide Web, biological
networks, and social networks [57]. The mechanism of preferential attachment and the
tness model have been proposed as a mechanisms to explain conjectured power law degree
distributions in real networks. The parameters are listed in Table B.2.
Figure B.3: A 100 node network created with the Pajek software [110]
Before the start of the simulation, the list of nodes in the society is sorted randomly
indicating the order in which individuals will make decisions. As soon as someone makes
a decision, he is reinserted into the list at a new random location, and the list is updated.
Additionally, external events g and g̃ are also interspersed in the list. At t0, all individuals
are initialized at state I. Initial values of the true reward vector χ̄ and the true event
probabilities are xed. Individuals receive a noisy estimate of the true probabilities and the
Table B.2: Parameters for the scale free extended BA network
Network Parameter Quantity
Number of vertices: (N) 100
Number of initial, disconnected nodes: (m0) 3
Number of edges to add/rewire at a time: (m ≤ m0) 2
Probability to add new lines: (p) 0.3333
Probability to rewire edges: (0 ≤ q ≤ 1− p) 0.33335
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rewards. At the time epoch tk, when it is the ith person's turn to make a decision, s/he
updates her/his personal estimate of the reward vector according to the inuence equation
(Eqn. B.2). Then s/he calculates the degree of attractiveness of the states based on the
normalized value V π(S, χ) by solving the Bellman equation (Eqn. B.1). The transition
probabilities are calculated as P (stk+1 = s
′|stk = s, σ = σ′) = Vnorm(s′)R(q, σ′, q′) where
R(s, σ′, s′) = 1 if σ′ : q → q′ exists, otherwise 0. The only dierence in the case of an
external event such as g, g̃, s or f is that everyone simultaneously updates their states rather
than asynchronously as in the case of internal events.
B.5 Block 3: Pattern Extraction with Symbolic Dynamic
Filtering (SDF)
An independent observer can estimate the global opinion state of the society by calculating
the percentage of people in the individual states. In practice, this data (here generated using
the interacting MDP framework described above) can be obtained by conducting opinion
polls, monitoring social network contents, etc. This global observation is passed to the next
block where it is processed using a stochastic signal processing tool called symbolic dynamic
ltering (SDF) [111] for extraction of characteristic pattern vectors. While the details are
reported in dierent publications [111], the essential concepts of space partitioning[112],
symbol sequence generation [113], construction of a nite-state machine [114] and pattern
recognition [115] are consolidated here and succinctly described for self-suciency and clarity.
B.5.1 Symbolic Dynamic Encoding
Let Ω ∈ Rn be the compact (i.e. closed and bounded) region within which the global opinion
trajectory is circumscribed. The region Ω is partitioned into a nite number of (mutually
exclusive and exhaustive) cells so as to obtain a coordinate grid. Let the cell visited by the
trajectory at a time instant be denoted as a random variable taking a symbol value from
the alphabet Σ. A trajectory of the opinion dynamics is described by the time series data
as {x0, x1, · · · , xk, · · · } with xi ∈ Ω, which passes through or touches one of the cells of the
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partition. Each initial state x0 ∈ Ω generates a sequence of symbols dened by a mapping
from the opinion space into the symbol space as:
x0 → s0s1s2 · · · sk · · · (B.3)
where each si, i = 0, 1, · · · takes a symbol from the alphabet Σ. The mapping in Eq. (B.3)
is called Symbolic Dynamics as it attributes a legal (i.e. physically admissible) sequence of
symbols to the system dynamics starting from an initial state.
Figure B.1 pictorially elucidates the concepts of partitioning a nite region of the phase
space and the mapping from the partitioned space into the symbol alphabet. This represents
a spatial and temporal discretization of the system dynamics dened by the trajectories.
Fig. B.1 also shows conversion of the symbol sequence into a nite-state machine and
generation of the state probability vectors as explained in the following subsections.
The time series data set of selected observable outputs such as the global opinion data
or percentage of supporters can be used for partitioning and symbolic dynamic encoding.
B.5.2 Probabilistic Finite State Machine Construction
Using the discrete-time discrete-valued stochastic sequence created by partitioning, the state
machine is constructed on the principle of sliding block codes [113]. A window of length D
on the symbol sequence S = · · · , s−2, s−1, s0, s1, s2, · · · is shifted to the right by one symbol
such that it retains the last (D−1) symbols of the previous state and appends it with the new
symbol at the end. The states of the machine are represented by blocks sisi+1si+2...si+D−1 in
the symbol sequence. Each state belongs to an equivalence class of strings characterized by
a specic word of length D at the leading edge. Thus, with cardinality |Σ| of the alphabet
and depth D of a symbol string of a state, the total maximum number of states in the D-
Markov machine is given by |Σ|D. The state machine moves from one state to another upon
occurrence of a symbol. All symbol sequences that have the same last D symbols represent
the same state. The machine constructed in this fashion is called the D-Markov machine
[111] because of its Markov properties.
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Denition. S = · · · , s−2, s−1, s0, s1, s2, · · · is called Dth order Markov process if the
probability of the next symbol depends only on the previous (at most) D symbols, i.e.:
P (si|si−1si−2 · · · si−D · · · ) = P (si|si−1si−2 · · · si−D)
The nite state machine constructed above has D-Markov properties because the
probability of occurrence of symbol σi` on a particular state depends only on the conguration
of that state, i.e. the previous D symbols. The states of the machine are marked with
the corresponding symbolic word permutation and the edges joining the states indicate the
occurrence of a symbol σi` . The occurrence of a symbol at a state may keep the machine in
the same state or move it to a new state.
Denition. The probability of transitions from state qj to state qk belonging to the set Q
of states under a transition δ : Q× Σ→ Q is dened as [111]:
πjk = P (σ ∈ Σ | δ(qj, σ)→ qk) ;
∑
k
πjk = 1; (B.4)
Thus, for D-Markov machines, the irreducible stochastic matrix Π ≡ [πij] describes all
transition probabilities between states with at most |Σ|D+1 nonzero entries.
The time series data at the reference uninuenced condition, set as a benchmark,
generates the state transition matrix Π which, in turn, is used to obtain the state probability
vector p whose elements are the stationary probabilities of the state vector where p is the left
eigenvector of Π corresponding to the (unique) unit eigenvalue. The state probability vector
q is obtained from time series data at a condition where one or more inuencing agents are
present. The partitioning of time series data and the state machine structure should be the
same in both cases but the respective state transition matrices could be dierent.
Pattern changes take place in the global opinion condition due to variations in the number
of inuences. These variations are a result of passive or active propaganda, word of mouth
persuasion, etc. The probability distributions obtained by analyzing the opinion data for
dierent inuenced conditions serve as low-dimensional feature vectors which are unique to
that particular condition of the society.
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Behavioral pattern changes may take place in dynamical systems due to incorporation of
external inuences such as fake reviewers, political party canvassers, etc. The pattern changes
are quantied as deviations from the nominal pattern (i.e. the probability distribution at the
nominal condition). The resulting anomalies (i.e., deviations of the evolving patterns from
the nominal pattern) are characterized by a scalar-valued function called Inuence Measure







where the d(•, •) is an appropriately dened distance function.
B.6 Data Analysis - Part I
In our experiment, to assess the resolving capability of SDF, we have studied the eect of low
numbers of inuences in the society. As a preliminary study, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 person groups
of external agents have been added to a total networked group of 100. This group randomly
forms links with people in the network; the probability of forming a link is 0.25. At a certain
time, this inuence group is activated all at once with all external agents initialized to state
R. Themselves being in state R and broadcasting a high reward value for R, this group
indirectly starts convincing its rst order neighbors to increase their personal estimate of
the payo χ(R) from state R. Furthermore, in this particular setting, probability of success
of the revolution P (s) being linked to the percentage of the population in R, individuals
develop a higher estimate of P (s) as a result of being associated with these inuence group
members. Even though the eect of adding inuences is easily understandable in principle,
for a particular case, the time series data denoting the opinion dynamics is remarkably
noisy and characterized by rapid unstable uctuations in the society. It is evident that the
uctuation statistics is a function of the number of extremist nodes present in the network.
Time series data for both nominal and inuenced conditions have been analyzed using
symbolic dynamic ltering (SDF) method for generation of statistical patterns of evolving
trends. For symbol sequence generation, maximum entropy partitioning has been used. The
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symbol alphabet size for partitioning is chosen to be |Σ| = 6 and the depth D = 1 for
construction of the nite state machine. Hence, the number of states in the nite state
machine is n = |Σ|D = 6.
Figure B.4 shows the results of SDF -based analysis of the time series data sets. The
top row of Fig. B.4 shows the time trace of uctuations in the percentage of government
followers for four dierent inuenced conditions of the society: a) uninuenced i.e. size of
inuence group |Inf | = 0, b) |Inf | = 1, c) |Inf | = 3, d) |Inf | = 5, and e) |Inf | = 10.
In order to generate statistically stationary data, the test data is generated for suciently
large number of decision epochs; suciency of data length is governed by a stopping rule
and has been discussed in [111]. The bottom row of Fig. B.4 shows the histograms of
probability distribution that are generated from the SDF analysis of corresponding opinion
data sets. The histograms represent the statistical patterns at the above four dierent
inuence conditions. As more and more inuence nodes are active in the network, the
statistical patterns gradually evolve from the nominal pattern of uniform distribution as
seen in plots Fig. B.4a-e.
Figure B.5 shows the prole of inuence measure with gradual increment in the
number of inuences. Inuence measure is quantitatively expressed as a (scalar) distance
(e.g. the Euclidean norm) between the statistical patterns (i.e. probability distributions)
corresponding to an inuenced condition and the nominal condition that are generated using

























































(b) |I| = 1; r = 7 : 3












































































































































































Figure B.4: Evolution of statistical patterns with increasing inuence group size
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Figure B.5: Measure of the amount of Inuence estimated by SDF
SDF of global opinion data. The distance function is chosen to be the Euclidean norm of the
dierence between the two patterns (see Eqn. B.5). A non-zero value of anomaly measure
indicates deviation from the nominal condition and therefore provides a warning of anomalous
behavior trends. It is seen in Fig. B.5 that the anomaly measure prole grows as the size
of the inuence group increases, but more interestingly, even small inuence (|Inf | = 1 or
|Inf | = 2) can be observed in the presence of random uctuations using this technique.
B.7 Data Analysis - Part II
In the last section, we presented results demonstrating the eectiveness of SDF in
distinguishing the eect of small inuencing groups in large population opinion dynamics. In
this section, we report the use of the SDF generated patterns in distinguishing the eect of
inuencing groups from the other source of perturbation in the global opinion - government
policies. In this series of numerical simulations, we modify the ratio of popular vs. unpopular
policies (g/g̃) imposed by the government and generate the global opinion dynamics data
for each case. The inuence group size for all these cases are kept constant at |Inf | = 3.
The patterns generated for all 11 cases are used to train and test a two-layer feed-forward
neural network with sigmoid hidden and output neurons. Such networks can classify vectors
arbitrarily well given enough neurons in its hidden layer. The network was trained with
scaled conjugate gradient back- propagation [116]. Once trained, the performance of the
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neural net is evaluated on a total of 22 separate data sets, 2 sets for each class as dened in
Table B.3.
Table B.3: Membership indicators for the 11 classes
Classes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
g/g̃ 1/9 3/7 5/5 7/3 9/1 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5
|Inf | 3 3 3 3 3 0 1 2 3 5 10
Figure B.6 demonstrates the resolving capability of the SDF generated patterns in the
form of a confusion matrix. The algorithm shows an overall success rate of 81.8%, but
even when the data is misclassied, the estimated class is not wrong by much, in fact
adjacent to the true class in both cases. Specically, the 2 datasets belonging to Class
3 are misclassied as Class 2 and Class 4, respectively. In other words, the government
policy ratio g/g̃ is estimated to be 3/7 and 7/3 instead of the correct value 5/5. The only
other misclassication occurred when the number of inuences is wrongly estimated as 3 in
one case and 10 in another, while the true value was |Inf | = 5.
Target Class





















































































































































































































































































































Figure B.6: Confusion matrix demonstrating the classication eciency of the SDF
generated patterns processed by a two-layer feed-forward neural network
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B.8 Chapter Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, some of the critical and practical issues regarding the problem of monitoring
opinion trends in societies have been discussed, and a data-driven algorithm has been
investigated. The two primary features of this proposed concept are: (i) an MDP architecture
for simulating cognitive processes, (ii) local interaction by exchange of reward information
between nodes connected through an extended BA topology, and (iii) a stochastic signal
processing approach for generating patterns from global information.
The reported work is a step toward building a real-time data-driven tool for estimation of
parametric conditions in nonlinear dynamical systems. Spread of inuence and recruiting
by extremist groups through social networks has become an important political issue in recent
years. This study is a step in the direction of building tools to preempt and intervene such
eorts. Further theoretical, computational, and experimental work is necessary before the
SDF-based trend detection tool can be considered for incorporation into decision guidance
tools. For example, an important issue in trend detection is the unavailability of data in
a convenient form. Often, the current state is not always directly observable, rather a set
of observations about the behavior may be available which provides an estimate of what
state the system is in. For example, even though an individual may not publicly proclaim
allegiance to a party, Twitter updates from that person may contain clues to his political
inclinations. The observations are probabilistic, so the observation model also needs to be
specied. These issues are currently under investigation using a Partially Observable MDP.
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